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7	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE	
8	FOR THE COUNTY	OF LOS ANGELES
9	ALLIANCE OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY	Case No.: 22STCP02772
10	PARENTS, an unincorporated association	ALLIANCE OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY
11	Petitioner and Plaintiff,	PARENTS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS; DECLARATION OF JULIE A. HAMILL
12	VS.	AND EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT THEREOF
13	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY	Hearing Date: September 18, 2023 Time: 9:30 a.m.
14	DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH; MUNTU DAVIS, in his official capacity as	Dept: 69 Judge: William F. Fahey
15	Health Officer for the County of Los Angeles; BARBARA FERRER, in her official capacity as	vaage. William 1.1 alley
16	Director of the County of Los Angeles	Complaint Filed: 7/26/2022
17	Department of Public Health; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,	Trial Date: 10/16/2023
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19	Respondents and Defendants.	
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OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS

1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 Cases 3 Americans For Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta (2021) 594 U.S.-6 -Applera Corp. v. MP Biomedicals, LLC (2009) 173 Cal. App. 4th 769 - 2 -Barnick v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc. (1988) 203 Cal. App. 3d 377 - 2 -Boorstein v CBS Interactive, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 456..... - 3 -Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844 - 6 -Founding Members v. Newport Beach (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944..... - 3 -Green v. Obledo, (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126 - 12 -*Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.*, (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802..... - 2 -People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2017) 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 781 - 4 -, - 5 -People ex rel. Totten v. Colonia Chiques (2007) 156 Cal. App. 4th 31...... - 4 -, - 5 -Residents of Beverly Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1973) 34 Cal. App. 3d 117 - 12 -Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th 155- 12 -10 *Taylor v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1185...... - 3 -Tenants Assn. of Park Santa Anita v. Southers (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1293 - 12 -11 Vosburg v. County of Fresno (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 439 - 12 -, - 13 -12 Statutes 13 Cal Corp. Code section 18200. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 369.5(a) - 5 -14 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 438(d) - 2 -Cal. Corp. Code sections 18000 – 24001.5 - 4 -15 California Corporations Code Section 18035(a)..... - 4 -Evidence Code Section 452......-2 -16 Evidence Code section 453 - 2 -17 **Treatises** 18 5 Cal. Transactions Forms--Bus. Entities § 25:20 - 4 -19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants County of Los Angeles County Department Of Public Health, Muntu Davis, and Barbara Ferrer ("Defendants") move to dismiss this case for lack of standing on the ground that "Alliance cannot prove that it is a legally recognized unincorporated association..." and "Alliance has not identified its members in written discovery, and its PMQ designee could not identify Alliance members, or any coordinated activity undertaken by the purported association." (Mot. To Dismiss, 2:13-17).

Defendants are legally and factually incorrect, and the motion should be denied for the following reasons: (1) There is no statutory basis for this motion to dismiss, (2) bifurcation will not preserve judicial economy, (3) Defendants misrepresent the "Founding Members" case (4) the law governing unincorporated associations requires "two or more persons joined by mutual consent for a common lawful purpose," which the Alliance of Los Angeles County Parents ("Alliance") easily satisfies, and (5) Alliance identified four members, objected to further member identification on privacy grounds, and the parties agreed months ago that this discovery dispute would be handled following the summary judgment hearing.

II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. There is no Statutory Basis for Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Defendants' motion is procedurally improper. Cases cited by Defendants do not stand for the assertion that Defendants can file a non-statutory motion to dismiss to be heard less than a month prior to trial.

Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802 involves a standing argument made on demurrer, which tested the sufficiency of pleadings. Applera Corp. v. MP Biomedicals, LLC (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 769 is a standing challenge brought up for the first time on appeal. Barnick v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 377 dealt with whether lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be raised as an affirmative defense, and the court determined

lack of subject matter jurisdiction is such a basic defect that it can be raised at any time by any available procedure.

Defendants do not contend that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; they contend that Alliance is not a legal entity. Those are very different arguments.

Defendants' motion appears to be either a backwards attempt at a discovery motion or a motion for judgment on the pleadings in disguise, improperly relying on extrinsic evidence outside the face of the pleadings. Under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 438(d), grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings "shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. Where the motion is based on a matter of which the court may take judicial notice pursuant to Section 452 or 453 of the Evidence Code, the matter shall be specified in the notice of motion, or in the supporting points and authorities, except as the court may otherwise permit."

B. Bifurcation will not Preserve Judicial Economy

The cases cited by Defendants in support of the idea that bifurcation will preserve judicial economy say nothing about bifurcation. *Boorstein v. CBS Interactive, Inc.* is an appeal of a dismissal entered after a trial court sustained a demurrer. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 456. Defendants cite *Taylor v. Superior Court* for the assertion that "[p]reliminary issues of standing and capacity to sue are most efficiently resolved at the outset of a lawsuit." In that case, the court explained that the demurrer improperly rested on lack of capacity when it should have rested on a defect of misjoinder of parties. *Taylor v. Superior Court* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1190. Regardless, the outset of this lawsuit was over one year ago. Neither case is relevant to Defendants' motion.

Judicial economy would not be served by bifurcation here because the same witnesses who will testify for the Alliance on issues of standing will also testify on issues of liability and harm. (Declaration of Julie A. Hamill, ("Hamill Decl."), ¶2). As described in this opposition, members of the Alliance came together to pursue action against the government due to the serious harm caused to their families by oppressive government acts, including the County's mandates and censorship of speech. The issues cannot and should not be divided.

C.

Contrary to Defendants' assertion, the court in *Founding Members v. Newport Beach* did not find that there was no standing. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944. In fact, the paragraph immediately

Standing, and the Alliance Functions as a Group under a Common Name

The Founding Members Case Cited by Defendants did not Find there was no

following the passage quoted by Defendants in their motion says:

"However, whether or not the Class A Founding Members were, as of October 1999, an unincorporated association capable of suing and being sued (as in Barr v. United Methodist Church, supra, 90 Cal. App. 3d 259) is not, however, the issue. The issue is whether the Class A Founding Members came within the definition of an organization as required by the governing regulations to exercise the Right of First Offer. Although, as of October 1999, there were persons who were Class A Founding Members of the Club, there was no organization of such Class A Founding Members as referred to in the governing regulations." Founding Members v. Newport Beach (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th at 963.

Either way, the Alliance functions as a group under a common name. This lawsuit is evidence of that. Filing a lawsuit against a government entity to petition for redress of grievances is a lawful purpose, and members of the Alliance are united by mutual consent, in part, for pursuit of that objective.

D. The Alliance is an Unincorporated Group of Two or More Persons Joined by Mutual Consent for a Common Lawful Purpose—an Unincorporated Association Under California Corporations Code Section 18035(a)

Defendants complain that Alliance does not exist because it hasn't filed any paperwork with the Secretary of State (which is permitted, but not required, under Cal Corp. Code section 18200), because it objected to identifying all of its members (which it has a constitutionally protected right to do), because its lawyer's school board campaign website references her involvement in founding the group (which is completely irrelevant to the existence of the Alliance), among other complaints. None of those things are required to establish an unincorporated association under California law. Further, Defendants grossly misrepresent the facts.

The California Corporations Code provides statutory requirements for a variety of entities, including corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, and unincorporated associations. Out of the various corporate forms, unincorporated associations provide the most flexible and least formal structure. *See, generally,* Cal. Corp. Code sections 18000 – 24001.5. Due to the informal manner in which many unincorporated associations are created, it is sometimes difficult to pinpoint

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the exact moment that an unincorporated association begins its existence. 5 Cal. Transactions Forms--Bus. Entities § 25:20.

An unincorporated association is "an unincorporated group of two or more persons joined by mutual consent for a common lawful purpose, whether organized for profit or not." Cal. Corp. Code § 18035(a). See also People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2017) 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 781 (Assuming that a permanent injunction against individual gang members required proof that membership in the gang was by "mutual consent" between the gang and the members, the gang satisfied that requirement, since the gang's members shared a common purpose and function under a common name under circumstances where fairness required the group be recognized as a legal entity); People ex rel. Totten v. Colonia Chiques (2007) 156 Cal. App. 4th 31, review denied (Criminal street gang was jural entity capable of being sued as unincorporated association by district attorney seeking permanent injunction against certain activities of gang to abate a public nuisance in designated "safety zone" in county, notwithstanding statute defining "unincorporated association" as group joined for "common lawful purpose."). Criteria applied to determine whether an entity is capable of being sued as an unincorporated association are no more complicated than a group whose members share a common purpose, and who function under a common name under circumstances where fairness requires group to be recognized as legal entity. People ex rel. Totten v. Colonia Chiques (2007) 156 Cal. App. 4th 31 citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 369.5(a).

In People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna, appellants made an argument similar to Defendants here; that a street gang could not be considered a jural entity capable of being sued because there was no evidence of formal acceptance into the gang, or that members must share property or affirmatively ratify crimes. The court rejected that argument and noted the absence of any authority imposing specific requirements as the sine qua non of an unincorporated association. People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1, 41, as modified (Mar. 10, 2017).

> 1. Alliance Identified Four Founding Members, Objected to Identification of all Members on Privacy Grounds, and Entered an Agreement with Defendants to Handle the Discovery Dispute following the Summary Judgment Hearing.

Defendants omit from their motion the agreement made between the parties regarding Alliance's privacy objections to identification of all of its members. (Hamill Decl., ¶¶ 3-7, Exhs. 1-

3; Defendants' Exhibit D, pp. 30 - 58, Responses #1 -18). Since at least April 2023, Alliance has repeatedly told Defendants that no members, aside from the four founding members named in written discovery, would be identified unless compelled by the Court, and any such identification would be made under a protective order. Defendants acknowledged Alliance's position well in advance of their motion to dismiss, and both parties agreed that disputed discovery issues would be handled via informal discovery conference following disposition of the summary judgment motion. (Hamill Decl., ¶¶ 4-6, Exhs. 1, 2).

On May 12, 2023, counsel for Alliance participated in a meet and confer discussion with Defendants' attorney Valerie Alter regarding discovery disputes. (Hamill Decl., ¶4-5, Exh. 1). During the call, counsel for Alliance explained its members' privacy concerns and that Alliance would not provide the names of any members beyond the four founding members already identified. (Hamill Decl., ¶4-5, Exh. 1). Following the call, Ms. Alter sent an email confirming the discussion. (Hamill Decl., ¶4-5, Exh. 1). Ms. Alter and Ms. Hamill continued to discuss discovery disputes and held another meet and confer on May 26, 2023. (Hamill Decl., ¶6, Exh. 2). At no point did Ms. Hamill ever represent that the identities of additional members would be provided absent a court order, or that Alliance would withdraw or waive its privacy objections. (Hamill Decl., ¶6, Exh. 2).

Despite this agreement, Mr. Raygor persisted in his attempts to force Ms. Hoge to identify additional members over repeated objections from counsel. (Hamill Decl., ¶9, Exh. 4).

Further, contrary to Raygor's arguments in opposition to Alliance's motion for sanctions, Ms. Hamill and Ms. Alter discussed the "witnesses" identified in the responses to form interrogatories as members of the Alliance. (Hamill Decl., ¶4). Following denial of the motion for sanctions, Ms. Hamill supplemented Alliance's special interrogatories responses to ensure there was no room for confusion or doubt that the identified "witnesses" are founding members of the Alliance. (Hamill Decl., ¶21, Exh. 6).

2. Additional Identification of Members by Alliance in Pleadings and Discovery Responses

In addition to the identification of members described above, Alliance (1) identified and described the harms suffered by Alliance members L.M., G.K., and E.S. in declarations attached to

1	the First Amended Petition, (2) identified Margaret Orenstein as a member in every verification
2	executed in this lawsuit, beginning with original writ petition filed in July 2022, (3) explicitly
3	identified members Margaret Orenstein in Alliance Responses to Special Interrogatory 18 (Hamill
4	Decl., ¶ 23; Defendants' Exhibit D, pp. 58 at lines 26-27) and Cynthia Rojas in Alliance Responses
5	to Special Interrogatory 20 (Hamill Decl., ¶ 23; Defendants' Exhibit D p. 59 at line 19) on April 28,
6	2023, and (4) explicitly identified Roxanne Hoge as a member in Alliance's Supplemental
7	Responses to Demands for Production on May 19, 2023. (Hamill Decl., ¶ 24, Exh. 7).
8	3. Alliance Members' Privacy Concerns and Defendants' Pattern of Harassment
9	United States courts recognize "that compelled disclosure of private associational
10	affiliationswill inevitably deter many individuals from exercising their constitutional right of
11	association." Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.3d 844; see also Americans For Prosperity
12	Foundation v. Bonta 594 U. S (2021).
13	Publicly speaking out against the government is fraught with risk, as Alliance has repeatedly
14	stated in its objections to identifying more than four members. People who speak up against covid
15	orthodoxy do so at great personal risk, facing threats of "cancellation," loss of employment, and
16	rejection by their communities. Defendants' motion demonstrates some of the reasons for Alliance's
17	protection of its members' identities. Defendants' personal attacks demonstrate Alliance members'
18	fears of intimidation, abuse and harassment are well-founded.
19	In each of its responses to Defendants' discovery requests to identify all members of the
20	Alliance, Alliance stated:
21	"The only remaining cause of action in this case is a challenge to Propounding Party's violation of Petitioner's free speech rights. Identification of all members of Petitioner
22	association is unnecessary and overly burdensome. Many members submitted information about harm to their children using first and last initials in order to protect privacy and avoid
23	retaliation by employers, government agencies, labor unions, and social networks, which is
24	one of the reasons the association and not individual petitioners brought this action in the first place. Petitioners are not seeking any damages – they simply seek injunctive relief to
25	rectify constitutional violations. Further, Responding Party identified sufficient witnesses for Propounding Party to ascertain standing in its Response to County's Form
26	Interrogatories, Set One. To be clear, those identified witnesses, Roxanne Hoge, Cynthia

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unwarranted, and unreasonably cumulative." (Hamill Decl., ¶ 21, Exh. 6).

Rojas, Sarah Beth Burwick, and Margaret Orenstein, are founding members of the Alliance.

The identification of all members of Responding Party association is accordingly irrelevant,

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Attorneys for Defendants have harassed three of the four identified members, as well as counsel for the Alliance. Despite counsel for Alliance instructing Defendants to reach identified Alliance members through her office in written discovery responses (Hamill Decl., ¶ 11; Defendants' Exhibit B, page 16, lines 21-24), Defendants sent a process server to Ms. Orenstein's home late at night while her young children were sleeping to serve her with a deposition subpoena. (Hamill Decl., ¶ 11). After counsel for Alliance contacted Mr. Raygor to request professional courtesy in scheduling a deposition at a mutually agreeable time and to stop harassing Ms. Orenstein's children, he dispatched yet another process server to Ms. Orenstein's home. (Hamill Decl., ¶¶ 11-12, Exh. 5).

Mr. Raygor's harassment of Alliance member Ms. Burwick is well-documented in Alliance's motion for sanctions, on file in this case. Defendants have refused to accept service of subpoenas for the declarants in support of Mr. Raygor's opposition to the motion for sanctions, and their declarations are belied by the transcript, written communications, and video evidence. The false labeling of Ms. Burwick as a "security risk" as a pretext to lock her out of the deposition of Barbara Ferrer has caused her serious emotional harm. (Hamill Decl., ¶ 13).

Mr. Raygor brought Alliance member Ms. Hoge to tears during her deposition by repeatedly stating her home address and the names of her children on the record. (Hamill Decl., ¶¶ 14, 15, Exh. 4).

Mr. Raygor then introduced photographs of Alliance's attorney's children into the deposition record. (Hamill Decl., ¶ 17, Exh. 4) Over Alliance's objections, after agreeing to exclude all photographs of Ms. Hamill's children and only use one page from the school board website, and after Ms. Hamill deleted all photos of her children from her school board website, Defendants filed a photograph of Alliance's lawyer's minor son into Defendants' **Exhibit J.** (Hamill Decl. ¶¶17-19, Exh. 4; Defendants' Exhibit J, pp. 238-245). Defendants' attorneys have repeatedly attempted to introduce Ms. Hamill's school board campaign website and personal information into the record, and following the frightening use by Mr. Raygor of photographs of her children during the deposition of Ms. Hoge, Ms. Hamill deleted all photos of her

1	THE WITNESS: I would say that people who live in the county of Los Angeles
2	who are parents or guardians of children who were in K through 12 schools at the time were discussing the relevant time period who agree with us and we
-	agree with them, and, you know, there's no dues, like I said. That's how.
3	BY MR. RAYGOR: So every parent of a child in K to 12 in Los Angeles County is a
4	member?
-	MS. HAMILL: Objection. Objection to the extent it calls for attorney-client privilege information or anything protected by the attorney work product doctrine. Calls for
5	legal reasoning or a legal conclusion.
6	THE WITNESS: I didn't say that. I would say that I know that we have to
6	agree. You know, it's like a fraternity. You don't have to like kill someone or be
7	jumped in, but you have to be part of the Alliance to be a member of the
	Alliance.
8	BY MR. RAYGOR: Q. How do you become part of Alliance then so you can
9	become a member?
	MS. HAMILL: Same objections.
10	THE WITNESS: I would say the first and foremost thing is that you have to agree with our objectives, which are to unmask our children and let them have
11	normal lives with even well, my objective was to open in-person school. I
	think we just all had that. So whether or not you actually had given birth to a child,
12	we certainly could have, you know, allies like doctors and people, child
13	psychologists who saw the danger and disruption and wanted to help right it.
13	BY MR. RAYGOR: Q. So if somebody is a parent of a K to 12 child in Los
14	Angeles County and agrees with your objectives and philosophies, are they
1.5	automatically a member?
15	MS. HAMILL: Objection. Same objections.
16	THE WITNESS: <u>I don't think so</u> . I know there's again, this isn't a money-making group. We're not trying to sort of like get a logo and sell T-shirts and do anything.
	But I know that <u>if they went to the website and we agreed</u> I mean if someone
17	was like, "Hi, I'm Barbara Ferrer and I want to join," probably not.
18	BY MR. RAYGOR:
	Q. Because she doesn't have children in K to 12?
19	MS. HAMILL: Objection. Same objections.
20	THE WITNESS: Because she's really committed to muzzling them and aggrandizing
20	the rights of union and labor people over children. So that would be a [no].
21	Q. Okay. I'll make it easier. How do you know my niece, who has a child in Los Angeles County in K to 12 is not a member?
22	MS. HAMILL: Objection. Same objections, and calls for speculation.
	THE WITNESS: I don't know your niece's name, and if I did know it, I would
23	not reveal it.
24	BY MR. RAYGOR: Q. Is there a way, if you knew her name, that you could check
24	to see whether or not she is a member?
25	MS. HAMILL: Objection. Same objections. Calls for information protected by the
	attorney work product doctrine, attorney-client privilege, privacy. Asked and
26	answered.
27	THE WITNESS: What she said. BY MR. RAYGOR: Q. Well, that was an objection. So if you knew her name, is
	there a way you could check to see whether she's a member?
28	mere a maj jou could enter to bee miemer bite b a memoer.

MS. HAMILL: Same objections. THE WITNESS: I can't answer that.

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BY MR. RAYGOR: Q. So if I gave you the name of any person and asked you whether or not that person is a member of Alliance, you have no way of being able to tell?

MS. HAMILL: Objection. It mischaracterizes testimony, and I'm going to restate the same objection and again instruct Ms. Hoge not to answer to the extent it would reveal any privileged attorney-client communications.

THE WITNESS: I'm not a lawyer, but I have played one on TV, and it seems to me that **if you want a list of Alliance members, the court will have to order it and our attorney, Julie Hamill will provide it.** (Hamill Decl., ¶ 8, Exh. 4, ALL.OPP. 47-52).

As stated on the Alliance website, the Alliance is

"a community group organized for the purpose of representing the interests of Los Angeles County children subjected to harmful and restrictive mandates by local education agencies, the County of Los Angeles, and the State of California. The Alliance advocates for fair, humane, and equal treatment of all children within Los Angeles County, for removal of all unnecessary, harmful, and unjustified restrictions against children, and for providing children with a full return to normalcy." (Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit J, pp. 246-247).

As explained by Ms. Hoge, and as stated in the First Amended Petition and on Alliance's website, Alliance members are united for a common lawful purpose (representing the interests of Los Angeles County children subjected to harsh and restrictive mandates, to advocate for fair, humane, and equal treatment of all children within the County and to remove all unnecessary, harmful, and unjustified restrictions against children and provide children with a full return to normalcy) by mutual consent (people in the specified categories are not automatically members – they must seek to join and be acknowledged as a member). *See* FAP ¶ 18. Due to the sensitive nature of the Alliance's work – which involves pushing back against the government – and the need for confidentiality explained above, counsel for Alliance handles intake of new members. (Hamill Decl., ¶ 30).

In order to achieve these goals, the Alliance engages in public advocacy and litigation. Most of this advocacy and litigation is done through counsel for Alliance. (Hamill Decl., ¶ 30). While Defendants persistently point out that counsel for Alliance identifies herself as a founder of the Alliance on her school board campaign webpage, it is a true statement, inasmuch as Ms. Hamill

worked with a group of parents in her capacity as an attorney to create the Alliance, and helped launch its advocacy and litigation campaigns, *pro bono*. (Hamill Decl., ¶ 31). Alliance is unaware of any legal prohibition this.

5. Alliance Offered Ms. Orenstein's and Mr. Rojas' Deposition Availability for PMQ, and Defendants have Refused to Depose Them

Defendants waited until July 2023, one year after the filing of this lawsuit, to begin taking depositions of Alliance members. Without attempting to discuss mutually agreeable dates, Defendants subpoenaed Margaret Orenstein, a founding member who has executed each verification on behalf of Alliance in this lawsuit. (*See, e.g,* FAP, verification; Hamill Decl., ¶ 11) Ms. Orenstein was out of the country on the date selected by Defendants in their subpoena. Alliance provided availability for Ms. Orenstein's and Ms. Rojas' depositions, but Defendants insisted that Alliance produce *another* witness to be deposed *in advance* of Alliance's briefing of the summary judgment motion. (Hamill Decl., ¶ 27, Exh. 8) Alliance agreed to produce Ms. Hoge for deposition, and noted that Defendants would need to speak to other witnesses to obtain the most qualified testimony on certain issues. (Hamill Decl., ¶ 28, Exhs. 5, 8). This was repeated on the record during deposition as well. (Hamill Decl., ¶ 28, Exh. 4). Defendants have still not attempted to schedule the depositions of Ms. Burwick, Ms. Rojas, or Ms. Orenstein. (Hamill Decl., ¶ 29).

Whatever additional facts this court may need to determine that Alliance is a lawful organization with standing to bring this action will be provided at trial.

6. An Unincorporated Association can act as Representative of its Members in a Challenge to Governmental Action

Unincorporated associations have a right to sue to challenge governmental action. *Vosburg v. County of Fresno* (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 439, 454 (finding an unincorporated association has standing to appear in an election contest *as a representative* of its members if (1) its members live in the area affected by the outcome of the election, (2) its members would suffer injury from an adverse outcome in the election contest, and (3) the questions involved were of a public nature. (citations omitted).) Courts look to the *public nature* of the question involved, noting that the right to sue is greatly relaxed where the question is of public interest." *Id.* (*citing Residents of Beverly Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles* (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 117, 109 Cal.Rptr. 724, and *Tenants Assn. of*

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Park Santa Anita v. Southers (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1299–1300.) Since a matter of public right is at stake, Alliance need not show any legal or special interest, as Alliance is "interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced." Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th 155, 166. This public right exception "promotes the policy of guaranteeing citizens the opportunity to ensure that no governmental body impairs or defeats the purpose of legislation establishing a public right." Green v. Obledo, (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 145.

Here, Alliance seeks to restore rights to free speech under the California Constitution, seeking to reopen the comment section of Defendants' social media pages and to enjoin Defendants from continuing to encourage private digital platforms to censor speech based on the speaker's viewpoint. These are questions of public interest, and a resolution of this case in favor of the Alliance would provide significant benefit to the public. The information revealed in discovery already has. (Hamill Decl., ¶ 32, Exh. 9).

At the time of filing the First Amended Petition, all Alliance members were Los Angeles County residents who resided within the County, owned real property within the County, had children who attended childcare or K-12 schools in the County, and/or played youth sports in the County. (*See*, FAP ¶18). More than a year later, some members' children have graduated from K-12 schools, like Ms. Hoge's. (Hamill Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. 4, ALL.OPP. 40:19-21). That does not negate the existence of the Alliance.

Further, while this lawsuit does not involve an elections issue, a similar analysis can be applied to the Alliance as was used in *Vosburg v. County of Fresno*: (1) Alliance members live in the area affected by the County's mandates and censorship, (2) its members suffered injury from mandates and censorship, and (3) the questions involved are of a public nature. *See* (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 439, 454. The issues in this case are unquestionably of a *public nature*, and therefore the right to sue is greatly relaxed. *Id*.

1	III. CONCLUSION
2	For the reasons stated above, Alliance respectfully requests this Court deny Defendants'
3	procedurally improper motion to dismiss and motion to bifurcate.
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8	Dated: September 5, 2023 Hamill Law & Consulting
9	By: _/s/ Julie A. Hamill
10	Julie A. Hamill
11	Attorney for Petitioner Alliance of Los Angeles County Parents
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DECLARATION OF JULIE A. HAMILL

I, Julie A. Hamill, declare as follows:

- 1. I am a sole practitioner with Hamill Law & Consulting, attorney of record for Plaintiff and Petitioner Alliance of Los Angeles County Parents ("Alliance") in this action. If called as a witness, I could and would competently testify to all facts stated herein.
- 2. The same witnesses who will testify at trial on behalf of the Alliance regarding formation and existence of the Alliance will also testify regarding liability and harm. The witnesses are Alliance members whose children suffered significant harm as a result of mandates issued by County of Los Angeles County Department Of Public Health, Muntu Davis, and Barbara Ferrer ("Defendants") and the silencing of dissent on social media platforms.
- 3. In all written discovery responses, on behalf of the Alliance, I objected to the identification of all members of the Alliance on privacy grounds. For example, see Defendants' Exhibit D in support of its motion to dismiss, pp. 30 - 58, Responses #1 -18.
- 4. On May 12, 2023, I participated in a meet and confer discussion with Defendants' attorney Valerie Alter regarding discovery disputes. During the call, I explained Alliance's members' privacy concerns and that Alliance would not provide the names of any members beyond the four founding members already identified.
- 5. Following the call, Ms. Alter sent an email confirming the discussion. A true and correct copy of that email is attached as **Exhibit 1** (ALL.OPP. pp. 2-3).
- 6. I continued to discuss discovery disputes with Ms. Alter, and we engaged in another meet and confer on May 26, 2023. At no point did I ever represent that the identities of additional members would be provided absent a court order, or that Alliance would withdraw or waive its privacy objections. A true and correct copy of Ms. Alter's email summarizing our May 26 discussion is attached as Exhibit 2 (ALL.OPP. p 5).
- Prior to the deposition of Ms. Hoge, I served written objections to the Notice of 7. Deposition of Alliance's PMQ, which included privacy objections to the identification of additional

members. A true and correct copy of the objections are attached here as **Exhibit 3.** Privacy objections are located at ALL.OPP. pp. 21:19-26, 22:1-5.

- 8. A true and correct copy of excerpts from the Deposition of Roxanne Hoge, which I defended, is attached as **Exhibit 4** (ALL.OPP. 36-57).
- 9. Despite the agreement between Defendants and Alliance regarding resolving discovery disputes after the summary judgment hearing, and over my privacy objections, Mr. Raygor repeatedly sought the identities of additional members during his deposition of Ms. Hoge. *See* Exh. 4, pp. ALL.OPP. 44:5-19, 46:10-19.
- 10. Attorneys for Defendants have harassed me and three of the four identified Alliance members during the course of this litigation.
- 11. Despite my instructing Defendants to reach identified Alliance members through my office in written discovery responses (*See* Defendants' Exhibit B, page 16, lines 21-24), on July 14, 2023, Defendants sent a process server to Ms. Orenstein's home late at night while her young children were sleeping to serve her with a deposition subpoena. On July 15, 2023, I emailed Mr. Raygor to remind him that he may reach Alliance members through counsel, and that this behavior is abusive, harassing, and unethical. A true and correct copy of that email is in **Exhibit 5** at ALL.OPP 59-60.
- 12. Mr. Raygor did not respond to my email. Instead, he *dispatched yet another process* server to Ms. Orenstein's home on July 16, 2023. I emailed Mr. Raygor again on July 17, 2023, asking him to display professional courtesy and human decency and stop harassing a represented party's young children at her home. I explained that if there was something he wished to serve on my client, he may provide a copy to me electronically and I would provide it to her. I asked that if he was trying to depose members of the association, to please work with me to coordinate schedules instead of unilaterally selecting deposition dates. I asked him to stop using taxpayer dollars to harass and abuse mothers who are simply seeking to enforce their constitutional rights. A true and correct copy of this email is in **Exhibit 5** at ALL.OPP 59.

13.	Mr. Raygor's harassment of Alliance member Ms. Burwick is well-documented in
Alliance's mot	ion for sanctions, on file in this case. I asked Mr. Raygor whether he would accept
service of a sub	ppoena for the two declarants who offered testimony in support of his opposition,
William Birnie and Quincey Collins, and he refused. The false labeling of Ms. Burwick as a	
"security risk," a pretext to lock her out of the deposition of Barbara Ferrer has caused her serious	
emotional harn	n. (See Alliance Motion for Sanctions, Declaration of Sarah Beth Burwick, 3:10-12)

- 14. Mr. Raygor brought Alliance member Ms. Hoge to tears during her deposition by repeatedly stating her home address and her children's names on the record. Mr. Raygor repeated Ms. Hoge's private address at ALL.OPP 37:8 - 19, 38:11-22, 39:7-24, 56:19-25, 57:1-7 in Exhibit **4.** The address has been redacted for privacy reasons.
- 15. Mr. Raygor stated the names of Ms. Hoge's children at ALL.OPP. 40:13-18 in **Exhibit 4.** Their names, which I did not know prior to the deposition, were not provided by Ms. Hoge and have been redacted for privacy.
- 16. Ms. Hoge expressed her fears regarding Mr. Raygor's repeated stating of her private address on the record, saying:

"I'm a woman who has survived a lot of things, Mr. Raygor, and I've a public person in that I have spoken for the rights of my children and other people I know, and I have had to deal with people showing up places. And I know you don't know what this is like, but women are uniquely vulnerable to stalking and to people looking for them, especially in a contentious action where union thugs and Antifa have felt the need to make their opinions known. So I'd really, really like my address not to be discussed in this deposition. I am who I say I am. I'm a real person, yellow color notwithstanding, and I don't understand what's happening." (Exh. 4, ALL.OPP 39:12-24).

17. During his deposition of Ms. Hoge, Mr. Raygor introduced copies of pages from my website for my 2022 school board campaign. (Exh. 4, ALL.OPP 54:1-22, Defendants' Exhibit J, 238-245). Included in that Exhibit are multiple photographs of me and my minor children. I objected to the exhibit in its entirety and asked that it be stricken from the record due to the photos of my children, and because it was a harassing and irrelevant line of questioning that I had already discussed with Ms. Alter as harassing. (See Exh. 4, ALL.OPP. 54:12-22, 55:2-11.) Mr. Raygor

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page of the school board website that mentions the Alliance.

21. While Mr. Raygor desires to rehash arguments made in opposition to Alliance's

motion for sanctions, the facts have not changed. I identified four founding members of Alliance, discussed them with Ms. Alter, and after Alliance's motion for sanctions was denied on the basis that I allegedly failed to identify Ms. Burwick as a member, on July 21, 2023 I served Second Supplemental responses to Defendants' Special Interrogatories wherein I stated: "[t]o be clear, those identified witnesses, Roxanne Hoge, Cynthia Rojas, Sarah Beth Burwick, and Margaret Orenstein,

agreed to strike all photos of my family and only use the portion of my school board website

campaign website and personal information into the record. As a result of Defendants' lawyers'

incessant harassment, immediately after the Deposition of Ms. Hoge and prior to Defendants' filing

of this "motion to dismiss," I deleted all photos of my children from my school board website.

Mr. Raygor during the deposition of Ms. Hoge, Mr. Raygor submitted eight pages from my

school board website, and included a photograph of my son in the filing. (See Defendants'

Exhibit J, pp. 238-245). For privacy reasons I will not identify the page on which my son's face

filed these documents with the court, especially over my objections and his promise to only use the

Defendants' attorneys have repeatedly attempted to introduce my school board

In support of Defendants' "motion to dismiss," in violation of the promise made by

There is no valid reason beyond harassment and intimidation for Mr. Raygor to have

that refers to the Alliance. (Exh. 4, ALL.OPP 93:12-16).

appears, but I will do so if necessary before the Court.

correct copy of those responses is attached here as **Exhibit 6** (ALL.OPP. 63-98).

22. Margaret Orenstein was identified as a member in every verification executed in this

are founding members of the Alliance" in response to Special Interrogatories 1-18. A true and

lawsuit, beginning with original writ petition filed in July 2022. See, FAP verification.

23. I explicitly identified members Margaret Orenstein in Alliance Responses to Special Interrogatory 18 and Cynthia Rojas in Alliance Responses to Special Interrogatory 20 on April 28, 2023. (*See* Defendants' Exhibit D, pp. 58 at lines 26-27 and p. 59 at line 19.)

- 24. On May 19, 2023, I explicitly identified Roxanne Hoge as a member in Alliance's Supplemental Responses to Demands for Production, attached hereto as **Exhibit 7**, at ALL.OPP.104:22-24.
- 25. Standing for an unincorporated association requires identification of two members. See Corporations Code Section 18035(a). At no point in time did I ever represent to Defendants that Alliance would identify more than the four members identified in written discovery and discussed at length over the phone with counsel for Defendants. At no point did I ever represent that the identities of additional members would be provided absent a court order, or that Alliance would withdraw or waive its privacy objections.
- 26. Ms. Orenstein was out of the country on the date selected by Defendants in their subpoena. Upon my request, Mr. Raygor provided additional dates upon which Alliance was unavailable. I provided a range of available dates for Ms. Orenstein's deposition and told Mr. Raygor that Alliance would be willing to extend discovery deadlines as a result of the unavailability. A true and correct copy of my email to Mr. Raygor is attached as **Exhibit 8** (ALL.OPP.117-118).
- 27. Alliance provided availability for Ms. Orenstein's and Ms. Rojas' depositions and noted that they would be the persons most qualified to testify on behalf of Alliance, but Defendants insisted that Alliance produce *another* witness to be deposed *in advance* of Alliance's briefing of the summary judgment motion. *See* Exhibit 8, ALL.OPP. 117.
- At Defendants' insistence, Alliance agreed to produce Ms. Hoge for a remote deposition, and noted that Defendants would need to speak to other witnesses to obtain the most qualified testimony on certain issues. *See* **Exhibits 5, 8.** This was repeated on the record during deposition. **Exh. 4,** ALL.OPP. 41:1-9, 24-25; 42:1-25, 43:1-13.
- 29. Defendants have still not attempted to schedule the depositions of Ms. Burwick, Ms. Rojas, or Ms. Orenstein.
- 30. Due to the risks associated with publicly challenging the government in the extreme political climate in which we live, including cancellation, retaliation, abuse and harassment, I

1	handle intake of new members for the Alliance through my firm in a confidential manner. I also
2	handle the majority of the advocacy and litigation on behalf of Alliance. Individual members
3	engage in advocacy on their own from time to time on the same issues, but the coordinated actions
4	by Alliance are executed through my law firm.
5	31. I have been involved in the Alliance as its attorney from the beginning, having
6	helped to create Alliance and launch its advocacy and litigation campaigns, pro bono.
7	32. There has been significant public interest in this case from the start. Multiple media
8	outlets have written about the litigation and the contents of discovery. For example, See, e.g.,
9	Swaim, Will, Barbara Ferrer and Adam Schiff vs. freedom of speech in Los Angeles County, The
10	Orange County Register, August 6, 2023, available at:
11	https://www.ocregister.com/2023/08/06/barbara-ferrer-and-adam-schiff-vs-freedom-of-speech-in-
12	los-angeles-county/, a true and correct copy of which is attached here as Exhibit 9 (ALL.OPP. 120-
13	122.
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15	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the forgoing
16	is true and correct.
17	Executed on September 5, 2023, at Rancho Palos Verdes, California
18	/S/
19	Julie A. Hamill
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DECLARATION OF JULIE A. HAMILL

1	PROOF OF SERVICE
2 3	I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 904 Silver Spur Road, #287, Rolling Hills Estates, California 90274. My e-service address is julie@juliehamill-law.com
4	On September 5, 2023 I served the foregoing document: ALLIANCE OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY PARENTS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS on the
5	interested parties in this action.
6	By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:
7	By attaching a true copy via electronic transmission addressed as follows:
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Valerie Alter, VAlter@sheppardmullin.com Kent Raygor, KRaygor@sheppardmullin.com Zachary Golda, zgolda@sheppardmullin.com Sheppard Mullin 1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1600 Los Angeles, California 90067-6055 Attorneys for Respondents and Defendants County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health Barbara Ferrer Muntu Davis □ ONLY BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION. Only by emailing the document(s) to the persons at the e-mail address(es). This is necessitated during the declared National Emergency due to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic because this office will be working remotely, not able to send physical mail as usual, and is therefore using only electronic mail. No electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful was received within a reasonable time after
18 19	the transmission. We will provide a physical copy, upon request only, when we return to the office at the conclusion of the national emergency.
20	BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: I caused said document to be delivered by electronic mail to the e-mail address(es) as listed on the attached service list.
21	By FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION: I caused all pages of the above-entitled document to be sent to the recipients by facsimile at the respective telephone numbers as indicated.
22 23	☐ (BY MAIL) As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. postal
24	service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Rancho Palos Verdes, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid
25	if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
26	☐ (BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY) By: Federal Express, to be delivered on next business day.
27	☐ (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I delivered such envelope by hand to the office of the addressee(s).
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2 3	☐ (FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.
4	Executed on September 5, 2023 at Rancho Palos Verdes, California.
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6	/s/
7	Julie A. Hamill
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