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9 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
10 **FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

11 ALLIANCE OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY
12 PARENTS, an unincorporated association

13 Petitioner and Plaintiff,

14 vs.

15 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY
16 DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH;
17 MUNTU DAVIS, in his official capacity as
18 Health Officer for the County of Los Angeles;
19 BARBARA FERRER, in her official capacity as
20 Director of the County of Los Angeles
21 Department of Public Health; and DOES 1
22 through 25, inclusive,

23 Respondents and Defendants.

Case No.: 22STCP02772

**ALLIANCE OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY
PARENTS' OPPOSITION TO COUNTY
OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC HEALTH, MUNTU DAVIS,
AND BARBARA FERRER'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
DECLARATIONS OF JULIE A. HAMILL,
CYNTHIA ROJAS, REQUEST FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE, SEPARATE
STATEMENT OF FACTS IN OPPOSITION
AND COMPENDIUM OF EXHIBITS
FILED CONCURRENTLY HERewith**

Hearing Date: September 1, 2023

Time: 9:30 a.m.

Dept: 69

Judge: William F. Fahey

Complaint Filed: 7/26/2022

Trial Date: 10/16/2023

24
25 *"Once a government is committed to the principle of silencing the voice of*
26 *opposition, it has only one place to go, and that is down the path of increasingly*
27 *repressive measures, until it becomes a source of terror to all its citizens and*
28 *creates a country where everyone lives in fear."*

Harry S. Truman

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 This case is about a government agency censoring speech critical of its mandates on private
4 digital platforms by leveraging backroom connections to congressional staff, media, and Twitter
5 executives. Los Angeles County Department of Public Health (“LACDPH”), Barbara Ferrer
6 (“Ferrer”) and Muntu Davis (collectively, “County” or “Defendants”) violated constitutionally
7 protected free speech rights by closing a public forum for viewpoint discriminatory reasons and
8 significantly encouraging private social media companies to silence their opponents. Defendants’
9 actions prevent free and open discourse on issues of critical public importance.

10 An inherent corollary of the right to free speech is the right to receive information. *See Bd.*
11 *of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico* (“Pico”)(1982) 457 U.S. 853, 867 .
12 Defendants harmed Angelenos by maintaining an illusion of consensus about a virus. As a result,
13 people remained frightened, treated fellow citizens with suspicion and disdain, and suffered
14 physical, psychological and emotional harm as described in the First Amended Petition and
15 Complaint (“FAP”). Plaintiff Alliance of Los Angeles County Parents (“Alliance”) seeks injunctive
16 relief to prevent Defendants from engaging in further violations of the constitutionally protected
17 right to speak and receive information.

18 As the County attempted to impose a universal mask mandate in July 2022, it sought to limit
19 public access to any information that conflicted with LACDPH Director Ferrer’s guidance.
20 Defendants attempted to remove truthful news articles from the Internet, disabled public comments
21 on LACDPH’s Facebook, Twitter and Instagram accounts (“Social Media Accounts”), and
22 leveraged connections in the office of Congressman Adam Schiff to a Twitter executive to remove
23 “anti-mask” content from Twitter. In response to the disabling of comments on the Social Media
24 Accounts, an Alliance member created a Twitter account to quote tweet the County’s content with
25 comments open to allow public discussion (“Alt Account”). Afterward, the County repeatedly
26 contacted Twitter to suspend the account. Following multiple emails from the County referencing
27 Congressman Schiff’s chief of staff, Twitter permanently suspended the Alt Account.

28 Defendants’ motion fails for the following reasons: (1) there are triable issue of material fact

1 related to Defendants’ viewpoint discrimination and censorship; (2) Defendants violated Alliance
2 members’ right to speak and receive information by closing the only accessible public forum for a
3 viewpoint discriminatory purpose; and (3) Defendants violated Alliance members’ right to speak
4 and receive information by significantly encouraging Twitter to censor opposing viewpoints,
5 including permanently suspending the Alt Account from Twitter.

6 **II. STATEMENT OF FACTS**

7 On July 7, 2022, Ferrer announced an intent to impose a new universal indoor mask
8 mandate. (Plaintiff’s Additional Material Facts (“PAMF”), #18). That announcement was followed
9 by execution of a public relations strategy to eliminate dissenting views from public view. The
10 strategy included a request to a news organization to remove an article written by medical doctors
11 from the Internet, the disabling of public commentary on Social Media Accounts, and thinly veiled
12 threats to a Twitter executive seeking “urgent action” to censor protected speech that deviated from
13 Ferrer’s messaging. (PAMF # 37, 38, 40).

14 On July 13, 2022, physicians at Los Angeles County + University of Southern California
15 Medical Center (“LAC+USC”) held their weekly town hall meeting, a recording of which was
16 posted to YouTube (PAMF # 19, 20). The physicians made statements that deviated from Ferrer’s
17 messaging, including the following:

- 18 • “[W]e’re just seeing nobody with severe COVID disease.”
- 19 • “[W]e have no one in the hospital who had pulmonary disease due to COVID. Nobody
20 in the hospital.”
- 21 • “[C]ertainly there is no reason from a hospitalization due to COVID perspective, to be
22 worried at this point,”
- 23 • “We’re seeing a lot of people with mild disease in urgent care or ED who go home
24 and do not get admitted.”
- 25 • “A lot of people have bad colds, is what we’re seeing.”
- 26 • “It is just not the same pandemic as it was, despite all the media hype to the contrary.”
27 (PAMF #20).

28 The following day, Ferrer again discussed her intent to impose a new universal indoor mask
mandate. (PAMF #21). Twitter users reacted by sharing LAC+USC videos and allegations of a
conflict of interest involving Barbara Ferrer and her daughter in the comment section of the Social
Media Accounts. (PAMF # 22, 23).

On July 19, 2022, the County’s Environmental Health division notified team members they

1 were expected to work overtime “[i]n anticipation of the reinstatement of the indoor mask mandate
2 on Friday, July 29th.” (PAMF #24).

3 On July 20, 2022, LACDPH Communications Director Brett Morrow (“Morrow”) asked
4 Twitter’s then-Director of U.S. Public Policy, Lauren Culbertson, for assistance dealing with
5 “harassment” from “anti-maskers” as the County was “likely going to bring back indoor masking.”
6 (PAMF #25). This email led to an exchange of at least 15 messages between Morrow and Twitter
7 (“Twitter Exchange”). Morrow led with his connection to Congressman Adam Schiff, stating, “I
8 was referred to you by my friend Patrick Boland, who I used to work with in Congressman Schiff’s
9 office.” (PAMF #29). Morrow included Patrick Boland’s name in all capital letters in the subject
10 line and copied Mr. Boland on the email. (PAMF #26, 28).

11 At the time of the Twitter Exchange, Mr. Schiff was Chair of the House Permanent Select
12 Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI”), and Mr. Boland was employed as Chief of Staff to Mr.
13 Schiff and as a Staff Member with HPSCI. (PAMF #27). HPSCI has oversight and investigative
14 authority over social media companies, including Twitter, and conducted investigations relating to
15 content moderation on social media prior to the Twitter Exchange. (PAMF #33). Prior to the Twitter
16 Exchange, Congressman Schiff and HPSCI publicly discussed amending Section 230 of the
17 Communications Decency Act, which provides immunity to social media companies for content
18 posted by their users. (PAMF #34). Further, prior to the Twitter Exchange, Congressman Schiff sent
19 letters to social media companies demanding information about content moderation policies.

20 (PAMF #35). Prior to the Twitter Exchange, REDACTED PER CRC 2.551(b)(3)(A)(ii)

21
22 (PAMF #36). In other words,
23 Twitter was under the regulatory thumb of HPSCI, and in particular, Schiff.

24 On July 22, 2022, the Southern California News Group published an opinion article entitled
25 “Bringing back a mask mandate in Los Angeles County is unjustified,” written by Scott Balsitis,
26 PhD, Jeffrey Klausner, MD, MPH, Houman Hemmati, MD, PhD, and Neeraj Sood, PhD
27 (“Opinion”). (PAMF #37). That same day, Morrow contacted opinion editor Sal Rodriguez and
28

1 asked him to remove the Opinion from Southern California News Group sites. (PAMF #38).

2 On July 26, 2022, in another Twitter Exchange email, Morrow complained about
3 “misinformation going around LA County and upcoming mask requirements,” adding “[o]pponents
4 are spreading the following misinformation...

- 5 • Dr. Barbara Ferrer is ‘a fake doctor’.
- 6 • LA County is lying about hospitalization numbers
- 7 • CDC is not recommending masks . . .
- 8 • Masks are not effective for adults or children.” (PAMF #39).

9 Morrow said he “reported a few [Tweets] but have not heard back if action was taken.”
10 (PAMF #40). Morrow continued, “[i]s it possible I can send links or misleading info to expedite?
11 Any other options?” (PAMF #40).

12 On July 30, 2022, Morrow disabled public comments on the Social Media Accounts, stating,
13 “[l]et’s do it for all posts. I’m over people rn. lol.” (PAMF #41). At that time, the County Board of
14 Supervisors meetings were still closed to the public. (PAMF #46). The closure of public comments
15 on the Social Media Accounts therefore eliminated the only centralized public square for discussion
16 of the County’s public health mandates.

17 On August 5, 2022, Alliance member Cynthia Rojas created the Alt Account, with the
18 purpose of quote tweeting all content from the County’s Twitter account with comments open to
19 allow public discussion and debate. (PAMF #47). The Alt Account biography stated: “Unofficial
20 ALT account created for @lapublichealth that allows public debate. We will RT all LA Public
21 Health dept content with comments turned on.” (PAMF #56).

22 On that same day, in another Twitter Exchange email, Morrow forwarded a link to the Alt
23 Account’s page and asked Twitter “[c]an this be shut down?” (PAMF #48). Twitter told Morrow to
24 file an impersonation report, send Twitter the number, and then Twitter would expedite the case.
25 (PAMF #49). In an August 10, 2022 email in the Twitter Exchange, Twitter thanked Morrow for
26 providing the case number and stated they were moving the case for further review. (PAMF #50). In
27 an August 10, 2022 email in the Twitter Exchange, Morrow asked Twitter for an update. (PAMF
28 #51). Twitter responded the same day that “[o]ur team has determined that the account is not
compliant with our policies and will look to solve this issue.” (PAMF #51).

1 On August 10, 2022, Ms. Rojas received a violation notice from Twitter stating that the
2 profile name violated the rules against impersonation, and “should clearly indicate that the user is
3 not affiliated with the subject of the account.” Twitter explained that “non-affiliation can be
4 indicated by incorporating words such as ‘parody,’ ‘fake,’ ‘fan,’ or ‘commentary.’” To unlock the
5 account, Twitter stated: “[m]odify the content that violates our rules... 1 profile name.” (PAMF,
6 #52). The Alt Account name was then changed from “ALT LA Public Health Account” to “ALT
7 LA Public Health Account – Commentary,” and Twitter unlocked the Alt Account. (PAMF #53).

8 Later on August 10, 2022, Morrow again emailed Twitter stating, “On first glance, it looks
9 like it’s already been unlocked and they just added “Commentary” to the name, but they aren’t
10 really posting commentary. They are just reposting our content.” (PAMF #54).

11 On August 23, 2022, Twitter locked the Alt Account again. This time, Twitter stated that the
12 Alt Account violated the rules against impersonation, and could be unlocked if the profile biography
13 was modified. (PAMF #55). At 3:15 pm on August 23, 2022, Ms. Rojas changed the biography
14 from “Unofficial ALT account created for @lapublichealth that allows public debate. We will RT
15 all LA Public Health dept content with comments turned on” to “Commentary ALT account created
16 for @lapublichealth that allows public debate. We will RT all LA Public Health dept content with
17 comments turned on.” (PAMF #56). Twitter then unlocked the account. (PAMF #56).

18 Two minutes later, Twitter permanently suspended the Alt Account. (PAMF #57). Four
19 subsequent appeals by the account owner were denied. (PAMF #57).

20 REDACTED PER CRC 2.551(b)(3)(A)(ii) (PAMF #58).

21 On August 21, 2022, Defendants posted a statement regarding closed public comments on
22 the Social Media Accounts. (SUF # 4). Since then, contrary to their policy statement, Defendants
23 have left dozens of comment sections open, dozens of direct messages have gone unanswered, and
24 at least 172 Facebook reviews containing information about herpes cures, cryptocurrency, and other
25 musings from the public remain on Facebook with no limit on the ability of users to continue
26 posting. (PAMF #59-62). Further, while the general public is precluded from responding to the
27 County’s Twitter posts, Defendants’ settings allow certain select individuals tagged in their Twitter
28

1 posts to respond in the comments. (PAMF #63).

2 **III. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

3 **A. Free Speech, Generally**

4 The freedom to speak is among our inalienable rights. The freedom of thought and speech is
5 “indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.” *Whitney v. California*, (1927) 274 U.
6 S. 357, 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). For these reasons, “[i]f there is any fixed star in our
7 constitutional constellation,” *West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette* (1943) 319 U. S. 624, 642, it is
8 the principle that the government may not interfere with “an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”
9 *McCullen v. Coakley* (2014) 573 U. S. 464, 476 (internal quotation marks omitted).

10 The provisions of the free speech clause of the California Constitution have been construed
11 as more protective, definitive, and inclusive of rights to expression of speech than their federal
12 counterparts. *See, e.g., Blatty v. New York Times Co.* (Cal. 1986) 42 Cal.3d 1033, 1041; *Gerawan*
13 *Farming v. Lyons* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 485, 491, 509 (protection is afforded not only to one who
14 speaks but also to those who listen.).

15 The First Amendment also protects the right to receive information. *See Martin v. EPA*
16 (D.D.C. 2002) 271 F. Supp. 2d 38, 47 (“[W]here a speaker exists . . . , the protection afforded is to
17 the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”) (quoting *Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.*
18 *Va. Citizens Consumer Council* (1976) 425 U.S. 748, 756). This right is “an inherent corollary of
19 the rights to free speech and press that are explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution” because “the
20 right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send them.”
21 *Pico*, 457 U.S. at 867. The Constitution generally prevents the government from interfering with
22 “the right to receive information and ideas.” *Stanley v. Georgia* (1969) 394 U.S. 557, 564; *see, e.g.,*
23 *Martin v. Struthers* (1943) 319 U.S. 141, 143. “The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing
24 if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them.” *Lamont v. Postmaster*
25 *General*, (1965) 381 U.S. 301, 308 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).

26 **B. Standard of Review**

27 Defendants bear the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the cause of action in
28 question “cannot be established,” or that “there is a complete defense” thereto. *Aguilar v. Atlantic*

1 *Richfield Co.* (Cal. 2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (“*Aguilar*”). Although the same standards for
2 admissibility govern supporting and opposing affidavits (CCP § 437c(d)), the opposition’s
3 declarations are liberally construed while the moving party’s evidence is strictly scrutinized.
4 *Saelzler v. Advanced Grp.* 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768. With respect to free speech issues, the
5 benefit of any doubt must go to protecting rather than stifling speech. *Citizens United v. Fed.*
6 *Election Comm’n* (2010) 558 U.S. 310, 327.

7 Defendants bear the initial burden of production to make a *prima facie* showing that there
8 are no triable issues of material fact. *Aguilar*, 25 Cal.4th at 850. If a triable issue is raised as to any
9 of the facts in a separate statement, a motion for summary judgment must be denied. *E.g. Insalaco*
10 *v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County* (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506, 521.

11 Here, Defendants cannot show that no triable issues of material fact exist or that they are
12 entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. The Alliance’s free speech claims are fact-
13 bound inquiries requiring a trier of fact to weigh evidence. The question of state action is a
14 “necessarily fact-bound inquiry,” and “the criteria lack rigid simplicity.” *Brentwood Acad. V. Tenn.*
15 *Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n* (“*Brentwood*”) (2001) 531 U.S. 288, 294 - 296, 298 (“There is no
16 single test to identify state actions and state actors,” and the Supreme Court’s “cases have identified
17 a host of facts that can bear on the fairness of such an attribution” of state action.) As set forth in the
18 separate statement, five material facts alleged by Defendants are in dispute. There are 46 additional
19 material facts supporting Alliance’s free speech claims. (*See* PAMF). The motion should be denied
20 on these grounds alone.

21 **C. While a Designated Public Forum may be Closed in Certain Circumstances, no**
22 **Traditional Public Forum was Available, the County Disabled Public Comment**
23 **for a Viewpoint Discriminatory Purpose, the County does not Exercise Clear**
24 **and Consistent Control over the Forum, and the Forum Remains Open to**
25 **Aligned Viewpoints**

26 1. *Defendants’ Social Media Accounts Were Vital Public Fora Because the*
27 *Traditional Public Forum Was Closed*

28 This case raises the novel issue of whether a government entity may close a designated
public forum where no traditional public forum is open. The dearth of case law on this subject is
unsurprising given the unprecedented nature of a global pandemic in the age of social media.

1 No published case in California has decided whether a government-controlled social media
2 account is a public forum, but Federal law is instructive on this point. (See MSJ, 11:6-8). The
3 County relies on *Garnier*, which notes that social media sites allow users “to gain access to
4 information and communicate with one another about it on any subject that might come to mind”
5 and thereby “provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make
6 his or her voice heard.” *Garnier v. O’Connor-Ratcliff* (“*Garnier*”) (9th Cir. 2022) 41 F.4th 1158,
7 1178, cert. granted 143 S. Ct. 1779 (citing *Packingham v. North Carolina* (“*Packingham*”) (2017)
8 582 U.S. 98, 107).

9 Defendants contend “the government has an inherent right to control its property, which
10 includes the right to close a previously open forum.” (MSJ 12:4-5). However, the Social Media
11 Accounts are not Defendants’ property. They are a “public square” in a private digital space – and
12 Defendants cut off the ability to speak and receive information in that public square. See
13 *Packingham*, 582 U.S. at 107. Defendants contend the reasons for closing a public forum are
14 irrelevant, but closing a public forum specifically to quash expression of a certain viewpoint is an
15 unlawful form of viewpoint discrimination. See, *Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n*
16 (“*Perry*”) (1983) 460 U.S. 37, 46. Further, Defendants did not completely close the public forum.
17 Rather, Defendants specifically closed public comment on certain posts, while keeping public
18 comments open on other posts deemed less controversial. (E.g., PAMF # 61, 62). Defendants also
19 allow *certain* people to post and respond to certain messages on this public forum, but exclude the
20 general public from such speech and interaction. (PAMF # 63).

21 Further, Defendants did more than simply close a public forum. At the time of the incidents
22 alleged in the FAP, County Board of Supervisors meetings were closed to the public. (PAMF # 46).
23 Accordingly, there was no ability for the public to physically assemble and exchange ideas in a
24 traditional public forum--the County’s chambers. In other words, no traditional public forum was
25 open or available to citizens for discussion of LACDPH decisions. Further, Defendants carefully
26 controlled access to Ferrer’s office, and questions from members of the public were curated by staff
27 and Ferrer during town halls. (PAMF #65). The public had no physical access to LACDPH. The
28

1 only public forum in which to freely exchange ideas with the masses was Defendants' Social Media
2 Accounts.

3 Defendants contend that because Alliance members can still post information on their own
4 social media pages, Defendants have not violated their speech rights. This is tantamount to arguing
5 the government could place *any* limitation on speech at its in-person meetings because citizens can
6 still say whatever they want inside of their homes. The ability to post a public response on a
7 centralized government account where citizens go to receive information differs significantly from
8 posting on one's own personal account. People are unlikely to seek out strangers' social media
9 feeds for divergent viewpoints on public health issues.

10 Days before Defendants closed public comment on the Social Media Accounts, videos
11 depicting physicians employed by the County contradicting Ferrer were shared in the comment
12 section of Defendants' Social Media Sites. (PAMF #20, 22). Defendants were concerned about
13 statements made in comments on the Social Media Accounts that undermined Ferrer's credibility
14 and spread "misinformation" about her ability to lead the Covid response. (PAMF # 42-45). For the
15 public, that sharing of information was vital, constitutionally protected, and provided a pathway out
16 of repressive public health mandates. For Defendants, however, that information threatened the
17 power and the credibility of their leader. (PAMF # 45). Defendants only want the public to see
18 information *they* deem credible or accurate. (PAMF# 42-45, 66). Defendants do not want any
19 contradictory information shared, even if that means eliminating truthful protected speech from
20 medical doctors from the Internet. (PAMF No. 38, 42-45, 66).

21 Further, the fact that the public can still communicate in limited ways with Defendants does
22 not mean their free speech rights – which include the right to receive information – were not
23 violated. The methods of communicating with Defendants presented in the Defendants' statement
24 are illusory. (SUF # 4). At least eight messages from members of the public were left unanswered
25 (PAMF # 60). Sporadically responding to direct messages does not solve the problem of eliminating
26 a forum where ideas can be exchanged in public.

27 Finally, alternate access to traditional public fora was available in all of the cases cited by
28

1 Defendants, and those cases involved issues like advertisements on a baseball field, not citizens
2 discussing public policy restricting civil liberties. *E.g. DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of*
3 *Educ.* (“*DiLoreto*”) (9th Cir. 1999) 196 F.3d 958, 962. The ability to communicate public policy
4 issues with fellow citizens and the government in a public way is critical to a self-governing society.

5 Defendants may contend these arguments are moot now that traditional public fora have
6 reopened, and Defendants can close designated public fora so long as they do not do so for a
7 viewpoint discriminatory purpose. However, that is not what Defendants have done, and
8 Defendants’ actions are capable of repetition.

9 2. *The County Cannot Demonstrate Clear and Consistent Control Over the*
10 *Interactive Portions of its Social Media Pages*

11 Exercise of clear and consistent control over the interactive portions of social media pages is
12 required to maintain a limited public forum. *Garnier*, 41 F.4th at 1179. What matters in forum
13 analysis “is what the government actually does—specifically, whether it consistently enforces the
14 restrictions on use of the forum that it adopted.” *Id.* at 1178. An “abstract policy statement
15 purporting to restrict access to a forum is not enough.” *Id.*

16 While Defendants are correct that “[o]ne or more instances of erratic enforcement of a
17 policy does not itself defeat the government’s intent not to create a public forum,” *Ridley v. Mass.*
18 *Bay Transp. Auth.* (1st Cir. 2004) 390 F.3d 65, 78, there are dozens of examples of erratic
19 enforcement in this case. (PAMF # 59-63). Here, Defendants’ enforcement of its policy is so erratic
20 that Defendants cannot pretend to exercise clear and consistent control. The policy statement does
21 not reflect Defendants’ actual practice.

22 In *Garnier*, the addition of word filters that prohibit comments and restrict users to non-
23 verbal reactions converted defendants’ Facebook pages from designated to limited public fora.
24 *Garnier*, 41 F.4th at 1179. Unlike Defendants’ content-based approach in this case, the filters in
25 *Garnier* were not manually added with each post, and they applied uniformly.

26 Defendants, on the other hand, fail to exercise clear and consistent control over the
27 interactive portions of the Social Media Accounts. Defendants attribute their inconsistencies to
28 “mistakes,” but the open replies, public reviews containing information about herbal herpes cures

1 and cryptocurrency, and unanswered direct messages show that Defendants’ “policy” is mere lip
2 service. (PAMF # 59-63). Defendants’ inconsistent enforcement of restrictions renders the Social
3 Media Sites a “designated public forum” subject to a higher level of scrutiny.

4 Not only does this lack of consistency show the forum is not “limited,” but it also shows that
5 the designated public forum was not “closed.” Defendants maintain the Social Media Accounts as
6 viewpoint discriminatory designated public fora. Regardless of whether the Defendants’ actions are
7 “mistakes” or intentional – the forum has been used in a way that is not viewpoint neutral.
8 “Mistakes” do not negate a free speech violation.

9 *3. Defendants’ Decision to Close Public Forum was Viewpoint Discriminatory*

10 Regardless of this Court’s determination regarding what sort of forum the County’s Social
11 Media Accounts are, if the Account is a forum—public or otherwise—viewpoint discrimination is
12 not permitted. *Int’l Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee* (1992) 505 U.S. 672, 679; *see also*
13 *Pleasant Grove v. Summum* (2009) 555 U.S. 460, 469–70 (viewpoint discrimination prohibited in
14 traditional, designated, and limited public forums); *Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund.,*
15 *Inc.* (1985) 473 U.S. 788, 806 (viewpoint discrimination prohibited in nonpublic forums).

16 A government agency may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or
17 otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression
18 merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view. *Perry*, 460 U.S. at 46. The government
19 must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the perspective of the
20 speaker is the rationale for the restriction. *Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia*
21 (1995) 515 U.S. 819, 829. If there is a bedrock principal underlying the First Amendment, it is that
22 the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
23 itself offensive or disagreeable. *Matal v. Tam* (2017) 582 U.S. 218, 243-44.

24 Under the First Amendment, the “government may not grant the use of a forum to people
25 whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
26 controversial views.” *Police Dep’t of Chicago. v. Mosley* (1972) 408 U.S. 92, 96. In the realm of
27 protected speech, the government is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about
28 which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue. *First Nat’l Bank of*

1 *Boston v. Bellotti* (1978) 435 U.S. 765, 784–786. Where the government’s suppression of speech
2 suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its
3 views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly offended. *Id.*

4 That is exactly what happened here. Defendants’ decision to disable public comments was
5 motivated by desire to suppress expression of viewpoints by “opponents” and “anti-maskers.”
6 (PAMF # 30, 39). Defendants attempted to censor truthful statements to maintain control over
7 public behavior, to sell another mandate to the public, and to protect Ferrer’s reputation and
8 legitimacy. (PAMF # 42-45). Before disabling comments on July 30, 2022, Defendants sent
9 multiple emails to Twitter complaining about “anti-maskers” and “opponents” and attempted to
10 remove an article written by four physicians criticizing Ferrer’s decisions. (PAMF # 25-30, 39).
11 Defendants had lost control of their message and were desperate to drown out dissent.

12 Further, excluding speech based on “an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction of the
13 audience” is a form of content discrimination generally forbidden in a traditional or designated
14 public forum. *Rosenbaum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2007) 484 F.3d 1142, 1158. “A
15 claimed fear of hostile audience reaction could be used as a mere pretext for suppressing expression
16 because public officials oppose the speaker’s point of view. That might be the case... where the
17 asserted fears of a hostile audience reaction are speculative and lack substance, or where speech on
18 only one side of a contentious debate is suppressed.” *Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King*
19 *Cnty.* (9th Cir. 2015) 781 F.3d 489, 502–503.

20 In other words, even when violent or disorderly reactions are anticipated, the government
21 cannot impose a prior restraint on or shut down speech. Here, Defendants’ goal was to exclude
22 threats, harassment, and misinformation. (PAMF #42). If the government cannot silence speech to
23 avoid a violent reaction, it cannot to do so to exclude threats, harassment, and misinformation.

24 Virtually all of the speech Defendants sought to suppress immediately prior to the disabling
25 of public comments was “anti-mask” and “opponent” free speech. (PAMF #25, 30, 39). The
26 targeting of anti-mask and opponent speech indicates that Defendants engaged in “viewpoint
27 discrimination,” a sort of discrimination beyond the power of the government. *See Simon &*
28

1 *Schuster, Inc.* (1991) 505 U.S. 105, 116.

2 Further, the particularity of the County’s demands places the County squarely in the
3 category of actions the government cannot lawfully accomplish. The government cannot lawfully
4 silence opponents, and it cannot dispatch a private entity to do so. Defendants did not just disable
5 comments. They engaged in a simultaneous effort to silence critics in all other aspects. Defendants
6 wanted the Alt Account suspended because it created an uncensored avenue to allow public
7 comment on the County’s posts, and therefore, Morrow insisted upon its removal from Twitter.

8 **D. Defendants Significantly Encouraged and/or Coerced Twitter To Censor
Content And Viewpoints That Contradicted Ferrer**

9 1. *LACDPH Leveraged Political Relationships to Censor Opposing Viewpoints,
Including Having the Alt Account Removed from Twitter*

10 It is “axiomatic” that the government may not “induce, encourage, or promote private
11 persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” *Norwood v. Harrison*
12 (1973) 413 U.S. 455, 465. State action may be found when: (1) a challenged activity results from
13 the State’s exercise of coercive power; (2) the state has provided significant encouragement, either
14 overt or covert, to private conduct; (3) a private actor operates as a willful participant in joint
15 activity with the State or its agents; or (4) the private action is entwined with governmental policies,
16 or when government is entwined in its management or control. *Brentwood*, 531 U.S. at 296. Further,
17 specific features of the government’s action may combine to create a compelling case for state
18 action, especially where a federal statute has immunized private conduct. *Skinner v. Railway Lab.*
19 *Execs. Ass’n (“Skinner”)* (1989) 489 U.S. 602, 615.

20 It does not matter whether government action is “the real motivating force behind” the
21 suppression of speech—that question is “immaterial.” *Carlin Commc’ns, Inc. v. Mountain States*
22 *Tel. & Tel. Co.* (9th Cir. 1987) 827 F.2d 1291, 1295; *see also Peterson v. City of Greenville* (1963)
23 373 U.S. 244, 248 (finding state action even assuming that the private party would have acted as he
24 did independently). The government actor need not have direct power to take adverse action over a
25 targeted entity for comments to constitute a threat, provided the government actor has the power to
26 direct or encourage others to take such action. *Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Cuomo* (“Cuomo”)
27 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) 350 F. Supp. 3d 94, 115 (citing *Bantam Books, Inc., v. Sullivan*, (1963) 372 U.S.
28

1 58, 66-68, (government lacked power to apply legal sanctions, but had authority to initiate
2 investigations and recommend prosecutions, thereby imbuing “advisory notices” with extra weight)
3 and *Okwedy v. Molinari* (“*Okwedy*”), (2d. Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 339, 344 (government lacked direct
4 regulatory control, but company could reasonably fear interference with economic benefits.)).

5 Where the government encourages and pressures private actors into adopting their preferred policy,
6 there is significant encouragement, overt or covert, constituting government action. *Mathis v.*

7 *Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.* (9th Cir. 1989) 891 F.2d 1429, 1431.

8 2. *State Action Analysis Requires a Fact-Based Inquiry That is Not Appropriate*
9 *for Summary Judgment, and no Single Rigid Test Applies*

10 Determining whether Defendants engaged in significant encouragement or coercion of
11 private social media platforms to censor disfavored speech requires an evaluation of facts that, in
12 this case, remain in dispute. *See Brentwood*, 531 U.S. at 295; *Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.*
13 (1974) 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (“[T]he question whether particular conduct is ‘private’ on the one
14 hand or ‘state action’ on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer.”). This area of the law is
15 far from a “model of consistency,” *O’Handley v. Weber* (“*O’Handley*”) (9th Cir. 2023) 62 F.4th
16 1145, 1156, due in no small measure to the fact that “[w]hat is fairly attributable [to the State] is a
17 matter of normative judgment.” *Brentwood*, 531 U.S. at 295.

18 3. *Defendants Significantly Encouraged Or Coerced Social Media Platforms To*
19 *Remove The Alt Account And Censor Protected Speech By “Anti-Maskers”*
20 *And “Opponents”*

21 Where comments of a government official can reasonably be interpreted as intimating that
22 some form of punishment or adverse regulatory action will follow from the failure to accede to the
23 official’s request, a valid claim can be stated. *Hammerhead Enterprises v. Brezenoff* (“*Brezenoff*”)
24 (2d Cir. 1983) 707 F.2d 33, 39; *Cuomo*, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 114. In evaluating “significant
25 encouragement,” a state may not induce, encourage, or promote private persons to accomplish what
26 it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish. *Norwood*, 413 U.S. at 465. Further, a public official’s
27 threat to stifle protected speech is actionable under the First Amendment and can be enjoined, even
28 if the threat turns out to be empty. *Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart* (“*Backpage.com*”) (7th Cir. 2015)
807 F.3d 229, 230–31.

1 All that is required is that the government’s words or actions “could reasonably be
2 interpreted as an implied threat.” *Cuomo*, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 114 (citing *Bantam Books*, 372 U.S. at
3 67 (First Amendment requires the Court to “look through forms to the substance”) and *Okwedy*, 333
4 F.3d at 344 (precise language is not the only relevant factor in determining whether a public official
5 has crossed the line between attempts to convince and attempts to coerce). The First Amendment is
6 implicated “if the government coerces or induces [a private entity] to take action the government
7 itself would not be permitted to do, such as censor expression of a lawful viewpoint.” *Biden v.*
8 *Knight First Amend. Inst. At Columbia Univ.* (2021) 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1226 (Thomas, J.,
9 concurring). Coercion includes “the threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion,
10 persuasion, and intimidation.” *Bantam Books*, 372 U.S. at 67.

11 Simply put, the government “is not permitted to employ threats to squelch the free speech of
12 private citizens.” *Backpage.com*, 807 F.3d at 235. “The mere fact that [the private party] might
13 have been willing to act without coercion makes no difference if the government did coerce.”
14 *Mathis*, 891 F.2d at 1434. Further, even a vaguely worded threat can constitute government
15 coercion. *See Okwedy*, 333 F.3d at 341-42.

16 *Missouri v Biden*, currently pending appeal in the Fifth Circuit, is squarely on point on the
17 issue of significant encouragement and coercion by the government. In *Missouri v Biden*, federal
18 agency defendants used meetings and communications with social media companies to pressure
19 those companies to take down, reduce, and suppress the free speech of American citizens. *Missouri*
20 *v. Biden* (W.D.L.A. July 4, 2023) No. 3:22-CV-01213 at 2, 75. They flagged posts and provided
21 information on the type of posts they wanted suppressed. *Id.* at 94. The unrelenting pressure by
22 defendants had the intended result of suppressing protected free speech postings by Americans. *Id.*
23 The court accordingly issued an injunction prohibiting government defendants from urging,
24 encouraging, pressuring, inducing in any manner removal, deletion, suppression or reduction of
25 content containing protected free speech posted on social media platforms. *Id.*, Doc. # 294. That
26 injunction is pending appeal as of this writing.

27 Defendants here argue they innocently flagged content for social media companies, and that
28

1 the decision to suspend the Alt Account was Twitter’s independent decision. We know Twitter
2 would not have acted on its own, however, because Morrow admits that he used the report function
3 in the Twitter application and nothing happened. (PAMF # 31, 40).

4 Further, “government speech” has its limits. While the government may advocate for its
5 policy preferences, it may not use its own speech to indirectly regulate private speech that it could
6 not regulate directly. *Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan*, 372 U.S. 58 (holding government may not
7 influence distribution of books by private booksellers); *Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito* (2d Cir.
8 2018) 879 F.3d 20, 30 (observing “government speech” is often more “properly characterized as
9 viewpoint-based regulation of private speech”). Flagging speech for suppression based on content
10 and viewpoint, which Defendants did here, is not constitutionally protected government speech.

11 Defendants executed a coordinated campaign to silence dissent in its quest to impose a
12 universal mask mandate in July 2022. Defendants attempted to remove truthful news articles from
13 the Internet (PAMF # 38), disabled public comment on Social Media Accounts (PAMF # 41), and
14 leveraged connections in the office of Congressman Adam Schiff, Chair of the House of
15 Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence at the time, in communications with a
16 Twitter executive for removal of “anti-mask” content from Twitter (PAMF # 25-35, 39). Morrow
17 persistently followed up with Twitter to shut down centralized public debate by having the Alt
18 Account suspended. (PAMF #47-58).

19 If Defendants did not intend to threaten or coerce Twitter to censor protected speech,
20 Morrow would have stopped after using the report function in Twitter. (PAMF # 31, 40). Morrow
21 would not have gone directly to a Twitter executive, citing his relationship to a member of Congress
22 who had been involved in demanding content moderation from social media companies. (PAMF #
23 25-36). Using the standard “report” feature in Twitter is one thing, but leveraging a government
24 position for special access to an executive, while invoking the name of a congressman with
25 regulatory authority, crosses over into a violation of free speech protections. While the government
26 speech doctrine provides some cover for government officials to implement policy and convey the
27 government’s position, it does not serve as an excuse to regulate private expression. *Shurtleff v. City*

1 *of Bos., Massachusetts* (2022) 142 S. Ct. 1583, 1589.

2 At the time of the Twitter Exchange, Congressman Schiff and HPSCI had oversight and
3 investigative authority over social media companies, including Twitter, and had been involved in
4 congressional investigations and hearings relating to content moderation on social media and
5 Section 230 reform. (PAMF # 32-36). While Morrow personally had no personal enforcement
6 authority over Twitter (and does not need it under *Cuomo, Bantam Books, Okwedy* and
7 *Backpage.com*), threats were implied by his reference to Schiff, who had authority at the time and
8 still has authority to investigate social media companies introduce legislation to amend Section 230,

9 REDACTED PER CRC 2.551(b)(3)(A)(ii)

10 (PAMF #25-36). This can reasonably be interpreted as intimating that some
11 form of punishment or adverse regulatory action will follow the failure to accede to Morrow's
12 request, and therefore a valid claim can be stated. *See Brezenoff* 707 F.2d at 39.

13 Social media platforms value Section 230 because it shields them from legal responsibility
14 for what their users post. *See Gonzalez v. Google LLC* (2023) 143 S. Ct. 1191, 1192. Defendants'
15 emails to Twitter invoking Congressman Schiff, Chair of a committee with investigative authority
16 over social media companies and the ability to introduce legislation to amend Section 230, were an
17 implied threat by the Defendants, amounting to coercion. (PAMF # 25-36).

18 Taken together, the facts show Morrow implicitly threatened Twitter with adverse
19 regulatory action by invoking Congressman Schiff in his persistent communications regarding
20 "opponents" and "anti-maskers," thereby significantly encouraging Twitter to interfere with
21 Alliance's constitutionally protected rights. At the same time, Morrow disabled comments on the
22 Social Media Sites to stifle discussion in a public forum. (PAMF # 41). While the Alliance contends
23 Defendants clearly intended to threaten or coerce Twitter to censor certain speech, such an inquiry
24 is a disputed fact-based inquiry and triable issues of material fact exist to defeat the instant motion.

25 4. *Jurisprudence on Censorship Via Private Digital Platforms is Developing*

26 Jurisprudence on government censorship of speech on private digital platforms is just
27 beginning to develop. Justice Clarence Thomas telegraphed impending United States Supreme
28 Court guidance on these issues, noting the principal legal difficulty that surrounds digital platforms

1 is “that applying old doctrines to new digital platforms is rarely straightforward.” *Biden v. Knight*
2 *First Amend. Inst. At Columbia Univ.* (2021) 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221 (Thomas, J., concurring).
3 According to Justice Thomas, “[t]oday’s digital platforms provide avenues for historically
4 unprecedented amounts of speech, including speech by government actors. Also unprecedented,
5 however, is the concentrated control of so much speech in the hands of a few private parties. We
6 will soon have no choice but to address how our legal doctrines apply to highly concentrated,
7 privately owned information infrastructure such as digital platforms.” *Id.*

8 Multiple cases involving government censorship of speech on private digital platforms are
9 advancing through the courts as of this writing. Two cases relied upon by Defendants, *Garnier v.*
10 *O’Connor-Ratcliff* and *O’Handley v. Weber*, are not settled law. Certiorari was granted in *Garnier*
11 *v. O’Connor-Ratcliff* (9th Cir. 2022) 41 F.4th 1158, 1177 on April 23, 2023. A petition for writ of
12 certiorari is pending review in *O’Handley*, 62 F.4th 1145. Further, two analogous cases, *Missouri v.*
13 *Biden* (W.D.L.A. July 4, 2023) No. 3:22-CV-01213¹ and *Changizi v. HHS* (S.D.O.H. Oct. 18, 2022)
14 No. 2:22-cv-1776 are awaiting decision at the Circuit Court level. Accordingly, rigid adherence to
15 any one test, especially one used in a case pending review by the United States Supreme Court,
16 would be improper. Likewise, granting summary judgment when the law is unsettled would also be
17 improper.

18 5. *Even if it Were Proper to Rigidly Apply the O’Handley Test, the Facts Are*
19 *Distinct*

20 Defendants cite *O’Handley* in support of the assertion that no free speech violation occurs
21 where a private party intermediary is free to disagree with the government. (MSJ 16:9-12).
22 *O’Handley* is distinct from the instant case in a number of critical ways, and admits “[t]his area of
the law is far from a “model of consistency.” *O’Handley*, 62 F.4th at 1156.

23 In *O’Handley*, the court evaluated whether to hold Twitter liable as a government actor for a
24 Section 1983 violation. Here, Twitter is not named as a defendant. Alliance sued government
25 defendants to enforce a constitutional right violated by Defendants’ repeated requests to censor
26 citizens, and for Defendants’ engagement in viewpoint discrimination in the closure of a public
27

28 ¹ The Fifth Circuit heard oral argument on August 10, 2023.

1 forum. Alliance seeks to enjoin continued interference with free speech rights and does not seek any
2 damages. *O’Handley*, on the other hand, sought to hold Twitter accountable for monetary damages
3 resulting from Twitter’s involvement in stifling speech at the government’s behest.

4 **E. Harm And Relief**

5 Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment because the court cannot order a
6 remedy. (MSJ, 17:6-11) Direct causation is often impossible to prove in First Amendment cases.
7 *See Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co.* (1984) 467 U.S. 947, 956. “[C]hilling a
8 plaintiff’s speech is a constitutional harm adequate to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.” *See*
9 *Speech First, Inc. v. Fenves* (5th Cir. 2020) 979 F.3d 319, 330-31.

10 Defendants caused direct injury to Alliance members and the public at large by significantly
11 encouraging and/or coercing social media companies to censor posts by “anti-maskers” and
12 “opponents” on social media and to suspend the Alt Account, and by disabling public comments so
13 that no person can post or receive critical information that conflicts with Ferrer’s guidance. By
14 silencing dissenting voices, Defendants maintained an illusion of consensus to justify prolonged
15 Covid measures. There exists a very real danger that the County will continue to censor opposing
16 viewpoints on future issues. When the next emergency comes, the County should not be permitted
17 to eliminate evidence of dissent to portray an illusion of consensus.

18 Alliance’s request for injunctive relief is not solely aimed at reopening public comment but
19 at preventing continued censorship attempts through backchannels with social media companies.
20 While Defendants do not have authority to reinstate the Alt Account, that account existed solely to
21 retweet LACDPH with open comments to allow public debate. Accordingly, reinstatement of the
22 Alt Account is unnecessary if Defendants reopen public comments on the Social Media Accounts.

23 It is not the government’s role to be the arbiter of truth, or to police bullying and harassment
24 on social media. Like the District Court in *Missouri v Biden*, this court should order Defendants to
25 stop seeking censorship of protected speech through private digital platforms. *Missouri v. Biden* at
26 154. Defendants may use the report function just like any other user, but pressuring social media
27 executives to remove content and accounts that deviate from Defendants’ views using implied
28 threats via back-channel communications is an attack on free speech.

1 8. Los Angeles General Medical Center, formerly known as Los Angeles County +
2 USC Medical Center (“LAC+USC”), posts videos of its weekly town halls on YouTube. On July
3 13, 2022, LAC+USC posted a town hall video, during which Chief Executive Officer Jorge Orozco,
4 Chief Medical Officer Brad Spellberg, MD, and Chief Epidemiologist Dr. Paul Holtom, MD,
5 responded to the messaging from LACDPH.

6 9. On July 30, 2023, I visited the YouTube Link to the LAC+USC July 13, 2022 town
7 hall, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=_fGuA-nU7EI&t=469s. I
8 transcribed relevant portions of the video, a true and correct copy of which is attached to the
9 Compendium of Exhibits and Request for Judicial Notice as **Exhibit 2**.

10 10. On July 30, 2023, I visited the LACDPH Media Briefings Site and clicked “video”
11 under “July 14, 2022.” The LACDPH Media Briefings Site opened to a Youtube page showing a
12 video recording of LACDPH’s July 14, 2022 media briefing. I transcribed relevant portions of the
13 July 14, 2022 briefing, a true and correct copy of which is attached to the Compendium of Exhibits
14 and Request for Judicial Notice as **Exhibit 3**.

15 11. On July 30, 2023, I visited United States Senator Diane Feinstein’s website and
16 downloaded a letter dated January 31, 2018 from Senator Feinstein and Representative Adam Schiff
17 to Twitter, Inc. and Facebook Inc. A true and correct copy of the letter, available at
18 [https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/f/3/f36602e9-c8b1-40bd-8a96-](https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/f/3/f36602e9-c8b1-40bd-8a96-c16132f46c52/7F053B22AA13FB07E55F4BE903018FF7.2018-1-31-feinstein-schiff-letter.pdf)
19 [c16132f46c52/7F053B22AA13FB07E55F4BE903018FF7.2018-1-31-feinstein-schiff-letter.pdf](https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/f/3/f36602e9-c8b1-40bd-8a96-c16132f46c52/7F053B22AA13FB07E55F4BE903018FF7.2018-1-31-feinstein-schiff-letter.pdf), is
20 attached to the Compendium of Exhibits and Request for Judicial Notice as **Exhibit 5**.

21 12. On July 30, 2023, I visited the United States Congress’ webpage for the June 13,
22 2019 hearing before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI”) entitled
23 “Challenges of Artificial Intelligence, Manipulated Media, and ‘Deepfakes’”, available at
24 <https://www.congress.gov/event/116th-congress/house-event/109620>. I downloaded excerpts from
25 the hearing transcript, available at
26 [https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109620/documents/HHRG-116-IG00-Transcript-](https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109620/documents/HHRG-116-IG00-Transcript-20190613.pdf)
27 [20190613.pdf](https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109620/documents/HHRG-116-IG00-Transcript-20190613.pdf). A true and correct copy of the hearing transcript excerpts is attached to the
28 Compendium of Exhibits and Request for Judicial Notice as **Exhibit 6**.

1 13. On July 30, 2023, I downloaded the Member Statement for The Honorable Adam B.
2 Schiff from the June 13, 2019 HPSCI hearing, available at
3 [https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109620/documents/HHRG-116-IG00-MState-](https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109620/documents/HHRG-116-IG00-MState-S001150-20190613.pdf)
4 [S001150-20190613.pdf](https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109620/documents/HHRG-116-IG00-MState-S001150-20190613.pdf). A copy of Mr. Schiff’s Member Statement is attached to the Compendium
5 of Exhibits and Request for Judicial Notice as **Exhibit 7**.

6 14. On July 30, 2023, I visited the United States Senate Judiciary Committee webpage
7 and downloaded Lauren Culbertson’s April 27, 2021 testimony to the Subcommittee on Privacy,
8 Technology, and the Law, available at
9 <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Culbertson%20Testimony.pdf>. A copy Ms.
10 Culbertson’s testimony is attached to the Compendium of Exhibits and Request for Judicial Notice
11 as **Exhibit 8**.

12 15. On July 30, 2023, I visited Congressman Adam Schiff’s website and downloaded his
13 April 29, 2020 letter to Twitter, Inc., available at
14 <https://schiff.house.gov/imo/media/doc/20200429toTwitterreconavirusmisinformation.pdf>. A
15 copy of Mr. Schiff’s letter is attached to the Compendium of Exhibits and Request for Judicial
16 Notice as **Exhibit 9**.

17 16. On July 30, 2023, I visited Congressman Adam Schiff’s website and downloaded his
18 December 8, 2022 letter to Twitter, Inc., available at
19 https://schiff.house.gov/imo/media/doc/letter_to_twitter.pdf. A copy of Mr. Schiff’s letter is
20 attached to the Compendium of Exhibits and Request for Judicial Notice as **Exhibit 10**.

21 17. On or about July 19, 2022, I received a message from an employee of the Los Angeles
22 County Department of Public Health. The employee desires to remain anonymous due to fear of
23 retaliation. The employee forwarded to me an internal message from Liza Frias, Director of
24 Environmental Health, asking employees to sign up for overtime shifts “[i]n anticipation of the
25 reinstatement of the indoor mask mandate on Friday, July 29th...” A true and correct copy of this
26 message is attached to the Compendium of Exhibits as **Exhibit 4**.

27
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1 18. Attached to the Compendium of Exhibits as **Exhibit 12** is a true and correct copy of
2 excerpts from the transcript of the Deposition of Brett Morrow, which I took on July 7, 2023 in this
3 case.

4 19. Attached to the Compendium of Exhibits as **Exhibit 13** is a true and correct copy of
5 excerpts from the transcript of the Deposition of Barbara Ferrer, which I took on May 3, 2023 in
6 this case.

7 20. On August 9, 2023, I visited the LACDPH Twitter timeline. Below each post on
8 LACDPH’s timeline is a message that states “Who can reply? People @lapublichealth mentioned
9 can reply.” This message appears on every post in LACDPH’s timeline. A true and correct copy of
10 a screenshot from LACDPH’s timeline is attached to the Compendium of Exhibits as **Exhibit 14**.

11 21. On August 14, 2023, I visited LACDPH Facebook page. As of August 14, 2023,
12 there are 176 public reviews, and no restriction on posting a new review or comments on existing
13 reviews on the LACDPH Facebook page. The most recent review is from August 9, 2023, and is an
14 advertisement for herbal herpes cures. A copy of the most recent review found on the LACDPH
15 Facebook page is attached to the Compendium of Exhibits as **Exhibit 15**.

16 22. On May 12, 2023, I served X Corp., formerly known as Twitter, with a deposition
17 subpoena for documents relevant to this matter with a production date of June 1, 2023. Following
18 months of exchanges with counsel for X Corp. in attempts to meet and confer, X Corp. stated that
19 they would be providing responsive documents beginning on August 7, 2023. As of August 15,
20 2023, I had received no documents from X Corp, and counsel for X Corp. has provided a variety of
21 excuses and justifications, always leading me to believe that the production would be imminent. I
22 am attaching an email exchange with counsel for X Corp. to the Compendium of Exhibits as
23 **Exhibit 16**.

24 23. On August 15, I received an email from counsel for X Corp. stating:

25 “Julie, we should be ready to produce today. It’s taken some time to finalize the production
26 with our review / production tool. You have not been strung along. Our correspondence
27 shows that, including that we even had to devise and propose search terms. Regarding the
28 lack of a protective order, we’ll have documents marked “confidential.” Those should not be
publicly disseminated, including not on your website. The only potentially valid use for the
documents would be in direct connection with the litigation, i.e., filing them with the court.

1 Can we agree that you would only potentially use those documents to file them with the
2 court -- and that if you intend to file any of those documents, you first discuss with me as to
3 whether X Corp. will agree to lift the “confidential” tag on those specified documents so they
4 can be publicly filed or, if we will not agree to that, you will request to file them under seal?”

4 I responded “Yes, agreed.” A true and correct copy of this exchange is included in **Exhibit 16**.

5 24. On August 16, 2023, I received 11,194 pages of documents from X Corp., all of
6 which are marked “Confidential.” I reviewed the California Rules of Court, Rule California Rules
7 of Court, Rule 2.551(a) and 2.550(d), which require a court order for sealing documents and do not
8 allow parties to file documents under seal pursuant to an agreement of the parties. I explained to
9 counsel for X Corp., a partner with White & Case LLP, that I do not believe sufficient grounds exist
10 to ask the Court to seal the X Corp. documents I intend to file as part of the opposition to the motion
11 for summary judgment. Counsel for X Corp. accused me of violating an agreement and stated a
12 reservation of rights against me and my client. A true and correct copy of this exchange is attached
13 as **Exhibit 20**.

14 25. I request the documents described in paragraph marked as **Exhibit 21** in the
15 compendium of exhibits be filed under seal pursuant to request of counsel for X Corp. I am
16 providing a copy of the Statement of Jonathan Hawk in support of a request to seal these exhibits as
17 **Exhibit 22** to the Compendium of Exhibits.

18 26. The documents produced by X Corp. identified in this declaration were not produced
19 by LACDPH in discovery and are redacted in this filing due to X Corp.’s claim of confidentiality.
20 Descriptions of the documents and their relevance are as follows:

- 21 • X_CORP_004627- X_CORP_004628, X_CORP_009394- X_CORP_009395,
22 X_CORP_005807- X_CORP_005809, and X_CORP_003037 - X_CORP_003038
23 REDACTED PER CRC 2.551(b)(3)(A)(ii)
- 24 • X CORP 010894 - X CORP 010969 and X CORP 010993 – 010998
25 REDACTED PER CRC 2.551(b)(3)(A)(ii)
- 26 • X CORP 010970 REDACTED PER CRC 2.551(b)(3)(A)(ii)

27 27. I was informed by an anonymous source that Mr. Morrow sought to have Sal
28 Rodriguez, opinion editor for Southern California News Group, remove the July 22, 2022 opinion
article entitled “Bringing back a mask mandate in Los Angeles County is unjustified,” written by

1 Scott Balsitis, PhD, Jeffrey Klausner, MD, MPH, Houman Hemmati, MD, PhD, and Neeraj Sood,
2 PhD (“Opinion”) removed from the Internet. A true and correct copy of the Opinion is included in
3 the Compendium of Exhibits at **Comp. Exh. 087-090**, marked as internal Exhibit 2 to the
4 Declaration of Brett Morrow.

5 28. I prepared a declaration for Mr. Rodriguez regarding this request and sent it to Mr.
6 Rodriguez for his signature. I received a response from Mr. Rodriguez stating: “Thanks Julie, just
7 need checking with my higher up to get the OK on this since it involves an attempt by the
8 government to get us to do something.” A true and correct copy of this email exchange is attached
9 here as **Exhibit 17**, and the draft declaration is attached as **Exhibit 18**.

10 29. I followed up several times with Mr. Rodriguez and the executive editor for Southern
11 California News Group and have not received any response. I intend to subpoena Mr. Rodriguez to
12 compel his testimony on this matter.

13 30. On July 24, 2023, I conducted a search for Patrick Boland’s salary records on
14 Legistorm, which is a non-partisan, for-profit company that researches, verifies and publishes
15 information about Members of Congress and congressional staff. I found Mr. Boland’s records at
16 https://www.legistorm.com/person/Patrick_Morrow_Boland/143419.html, and have included a
17 request that the court take judicial notice of his dates of employment and title with Congressman
18 Adam Schiff in the attached Request for Judicial Notice.

19 31. On July 24, 2023, I conducted a search for the dates that Congressman Schiff acted
20 as Chairman for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Biographical Directory of
21 the United States Congress, available at <https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/S001150>, shows
22 Mr. Schiff served as Chair in the 116th and 117th congress, which spanned from January 3, 2019
23 through January 3, 2023 according to
24 <https://www.senate.gov/legislative/DatesofSessionsofCongress.htm>. I have included a request that
25 the court take judicial notice of Mr. Schiff’s dates of service as Chairman of the House Permanent
26 Select Committee on Intelligence in the attached Request for Judicial Notice.

27 32. Pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Section 437c(h), facts identified in paragraphs 21 –
28 28 essential to justify Alliance’s opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated above, be

1 presented, and Alliance accordingly asks the court to deny the motion, order a continuance to permit
2 affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just. This
3 includes an order regarding the sealing of records requested by X Corp., review and analysis of a
4 forthcoming privilege log from X Corp. that may reveal additional evidence, and a subpoena to Mr.
5 Rodriguez regarding testimony relating to requests made by Brett Morrow to remove content from
6 Southern California News Group websites.

7
8 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the forgoing
9 is true and correct.

10 Executed on August 18, 2023, at Beulah, Michigan

11 _____/S/_____

12 Julie A. Hamill

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DECLARATION OF CYNTHIA ROJAS

I, Cynthia Rojas, declare as follows:

1. I am a member of the Alliance of Los Angeles County Parents. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this declaration. If called as a witness, I am competent to testify to these facts.

2. On or about July 30, 2022, Los Angeles County Department of Public Health (“LACPH”) disabled public comments on their Twitter account, identified as @lapublichealth.

3. LACPH’s disabling of public comments eliminated my ability to post and receive information that called into question LACPH’s guidance in the comment section below official LACPH announcements.

4. On August 5, 2022, I created a Twitter account with the handle “@ALT_lacph” called “ALT LA Public Health Account” (“Alt Account”). I modeled the account after other alt accounts I had seen on Twitter, including @Alt_CDC. I documented my experience with the Alt Account in notes attached here as **Exhibit 19**.

5. The purpose of the Alt Account was to Quote Tweet content from @lapublichealth with comments open to allow public debate. The “Quote Tweet” feature allows you to Tweet another person’s Tweet with your own comment added.

6. The Alt Account only followed @lapublichealth and did not comment on or like any Tweets.

7. The Alt Account biography stated “Unofficial ALT account created for @lapublichealth that allows public debate. We will RT all LA Public Health dept content with comments turned on.”

8. On August 10, 2022, Twitter locked the Alt Account. Twitter stated in the violation notice that the profile name violated the rules against impersonation, and “should clearly indicate that the user is not affiliated with the subject of the account.” Twitter explained that “non-affiliation can be indicated by incorporating words such as ‘parody,’ ‘fake,’ ‘fan,’ or ‘commentary.’” To unlock the account, Twitter stated: “Modify the content that violates our rules... 1 profile name.” A screenshot of Twitter’s message to me is on page 173 of the document attached as **Exhibit 19**.

1 9. The account name was then changed from “ALT LA Public Health Account” to
2 “ALT LA Public Health Account – Commentary,” and Twitter unlocked the Alt Account.

3 10. On August 23, 2022, Twitter locked the Alt Account again. This time, Twitter stated
4 that the Alt Account violated the rules against impersonation, and could be unlocked if I modified
5 the profile biography.

6 11. At 3:15 pm on August 23, 2022, I changed the biography from “Unofficial ALT
7 account created for @lapublichealth that allows public debate. We will RT all LA Public Health
8 dept content with comments turned on” to “Commentary ALT account created for @lapublichealth
9 that allows public debate. We will RT all LA Public Health dept content with comments turned on.”
10 Twitter then unlocked the account.

11 12. Two minutes later, at 3:17 pm on August 23, 2022, Twitter permanently suspended
12 the Alt Account. I received an email from Twitter stating “[y]our account has been suspended for
13 violation(s) of Twitter’s rules, specifically our policy regarding parody, newsfeed, commentary, and
14 fan accounts.”

15 13. I appealed the suspension to Twitter. On August 24, 2022, Twitter Support emailed
16 me stating: “We’ve reviewed your appeal, and determined that your account will remain suspended
17 for violation(s) of our parody, newsfeed, commentary, and fan account policy.”

18 14. Twitter denied three additional appeals on October 27, December 10, and December
19 12, 2022.

20 15. I am aware of many other “alt” accounts, including the @Alt_CDC account, that
21 continue to exist on Twitter without permanent suspension.

22 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the forgoing
23 is true and correct.

24 Executed on August ⁹, 2023, at Laguna Niguel, California

25 DocuSigned by:
26 
27 CD3907E3B2D7468...
28 **Cynthia Rojas**

1 **PROOF OF SERVICE**

2 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, I am over the age of
3 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 904 Silver Spur Road, #287, Rolling
4 Hills Estates, California 90274. My e-service address is julie@juliehamill-law.com..

5 On August 18, 2023 I served the foregoing document: **ALLIANCE OF LOS ANGELES
6 COUNTY PARENTS’ OPPOSITION TO COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT
7 OF PUBLIC HEALTH, MUNTU DAVIS, AND BARBARA FERRER’S MOTION FOR
8 SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DECLARATIONS OF JULIE A. HAMILL AND CYNTHIA
9 ROJAS IN SUPPORT THEREOF; REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; SEPARATE
10 STATEMENT OF FACTS IN OPPOSITION; AND COMPENDIUM OF EXHIBITS** on the
11 interested parties in this action.

12 By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:

13 By attaching a true copy via electronic transmission addressed as follows:

14 Valerie Alter, VAlter@sheppardmullin.com
15 Kent Raygor, KRaygor@sheppardmullin.com
16 Zachary Golda, zgolda@sheppardmullin.com
17 Sheppard Mullin
18 1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1600
19 Los Angeles, California 90067-6055
20 Attorneys for Respondents and Defendants
21 County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health
22 Barbara Ferrer
23 Muntu Davis

24 **ONLY BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION.** Only by emailing the document(s) to the
25 persons at the e-mail address(es). This is necessitated during the declared National Emergency due
26 to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic because this office will be working remotely, not able to
27 send physical mail as usual, and is therefore using only electronic mail. No electronic message or
28 other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful was received within a reasonable time after
the transmission. We will provide a physical copy, upon request only, when we return to the office at
the conclusion of the national emergency.

BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: I caused said document to be delivered by electronic mail to the
e-mail address(es) as listed on the attached service list.

By FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION: I caused all pages of the above-entitled document to be
sent to the recipients by facsimile at the respective telephone numbers as indicated.

(BY MAIL) As follows: I am “readily familiar” with the firm’s practice of collection and
processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. postal
service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Rancho Palos Verdes, California in the
ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid
if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for
mailing in affidavit.

(BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY) By: Federal Express, to be delivered on next business day.

1 (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I delivered such envelope by hand to the office of the
2 addressee(s).

3 (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
4 above is true and correct.

5 (FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at
6 whose direction the service was made.

Executed on August 18, 2023 at Beulah, Michigan.

7
8 /s/

9 _____
Julie A. Hamill

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