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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP KENT R. RAYGOR, Cal. Bar No. 117224 kraygor@sheppardmullin.com VALERIE E. ALTER, Cal. Bar No. 239905 valter@sheppardmullin.com ZACHARY J. GOLDA, Cal. Bar No. 327532 zgolda@sheppardmullin.com 1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1600 Los Angeles, California 90067-6055 Telephone: (310) 228-3700 Facsimile: (310) 228-3701 Attorneys for Defendants COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, MUNTU DAVIS, M.D., and BARBARA FERRER, PhD		
10	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
11	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT		
12	ALLIANCE OF LOS ANGELES	Case No. 22STCP02772	
13	COUNTY PARENTS, an unincorporated	Assigned for All Purposes to:	
14	association,	Hon. James C. Chalfant, Dept. 85	
15 16 17 18 19 20 22 22 22 22 22 22 2	Petitioner and Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH; MUNTU DAVIS, in his official capacity as Health Officer for the County of Los Angeles; BARBARA FERRER, in her official capacity as Director of the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Respondents and Defendants.	 (1) DEFENDANTS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH'S, MUNTU DAVIS, M.D.'S, AND BARBARA FERRER, PHD'S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED PETITION: (2) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF: (3) DECLARATION OF VALERIE E. ALTER IN SUPPORT THEREOF [Request for Judicial Notice and Declaration of Zachary Golda filed concurrently herewith] Hearing Date: December 15, 2022 Time: 9:30 a.m. Dep't: 85 Complaint Filed: July 26, 2022 Trial Date: Not Set 	
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DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED PETITION

TO THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED COURT AND TO PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR **ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

Please take notice that on December 15, 2022, at 9:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as this matter can be heard in Department 85 of the above-captioned Court, located at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Defendants Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, Muntu Davis, M.D., in his official capacity as Health Officer for the County of Los Angeles, and Barbara Ferrer, PhD, in her official capacity as Director of the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health (collectively "LACDPH") will and hereby do bring this demurrer pursuant to CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 430.10(e) to the *First* Amended Petition filed on September 30, 2022 by Plaintiff Alliance of Los Angeles County Parents.

This demurrer is made on the ground that Plaintiff's first, second, and fourth causes of action fail to set forth sufficient facts to state a cause of action against LACDPH.

This demurrer is based on this notice, the attached demurrer, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the attached Declaration of Valerie E. Alter in compliance with CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 430.41, and all other pleadings, records, and papers on file, deemed to be on file, or of which this Court may or must take judicial notice at the time this demurrer is heard, and upon such further evidence and arguments as may be presented at or before the time of the hearing of this demurrer.

SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP 21 Dated: October 31, 2022

By

KENT R. RAYGOR

Attorneys for Defendants COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, MUNTU DAVIS, M.D., and BARBARA FERRER, PhD

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1	<u>DEMURRER</u>	
2	Defendants Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, Muntu Davis, M.D., in	
3	his official capacity as Health Officer for the County of Los Angeles, and Barbara Ferrer,	
4	PhD, in her official capacity as Director of the County of Los Angeles Department of Public	
5	Health (collectively "LACDPH") demur to the First Amended Petition filed on September	
6	30, 2022 by Plaintiff Alliance for Los Angeles County Parents as follows:	
7	DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION	
8	1. Plaintiff's first cause of action for "Petition for Writ of Mandate – Abuse of	
9	Discretion under Health and Safety Code sections 120175 and 101040", fails to state facts	
10	sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the LACDPH Defendants. CAL. CIV. PROC	
11	CODE § 430.10(e).	
12	DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION	
13	2. Plaintiff's second cause of action for "Violation Of Equal Protection Clause O	
14	California Constitution", fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against	
15	the LACDPH Defendants. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.10(e).	
16	DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION	
17	3. Plaintiff's fourth cause of action for "Deprivation of Substantive Due	
18	Process", fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the LACDPH	
19	Defendants. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.10(e).	
20	Dated: October 31, 2022 SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP	
21	$V_{i} + OO$	
22	By KENTR RAYGOR	
23	Attorneys for Defendants	
24	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, MUNTU DAVIS, M.D.,	
25	and BARBARA FERRER. PhD	
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<u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Defendants Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, Muntu Davis, M.D., and Barbara Ferrer, PhD's (collectively "LACDPH") demurrer to the *First Amended Petition* ("*FAP*") filed on September 30, 2022, by Plaintiff Alliance of Los Angeles County Parents should be sustained.

I.

Plaintiff challenges a COVID-19 order promulgated by LACDPH that requires people in the County who have been exposed to COVID-19 to mask while indoors for a period of ten days after the exposure. According to Plaintiff, that order is arbitrary and capricious because Plaintiff disagrees with the LACDPH's interpretation of COVID-19 hospitalization and transmission data, and the studies upon which LACDPH relied in issuing the challenged orders. On this basis, Plaintiff asserts:

- The first cause of action, seeking a petition for writ of mandate asserting that the LACDPH Defendants abused their discretion under CALIFORNIA HEALTH
 & SAFETY CODE sections 120175 and 101040;
- The second cause of action for violation of equal protection; and
- The fourth cause of action for violation of substantive due process rights.

The first cause of action admittedly is subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. The second cause of action is subject to the similar rational basis standard of review because, as Plaintiff admits, the challenged order does not treat or implicate a suspect or protected class. The fourth cause of action is subject to the same rational basis standard of review because the challenged order does not implicate a fundamental right. Plaintiff's claims must fail given the operative standard of review.

Plaintiff challenges LACDPH's interpretation of the relevant data. In so doing, Plaintiffs *concede* that LACDPH considered that data. Plaintiff's request that this Court sit as super-scientist and substitute its judgment for that of LACDPH as to the relevant data must fail. This is especially true because documents subject to judicial notice demonstrate that the challenged COVID-19 orders align with guidance promulgated by the Centers for

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Disease Control ("CDC"), the highest public health authority in the nation. Thus, Plaintiff's first, second, and fourth claims fail as a matter of law, and LACDPH's demurrer should be sustained.

II.

FACTS PLED IN THE FIRST AMENDED PETITION

A. The Parties.

Plaintiff alleges that it is an unincorporated association that was organized for the purpose of representing the interests of children residing in the County of Los Angeles ("County"). [FAP, ¶ 18.] Defendant Los Angeles County Department Of Public Health is the local health care agency for the County, defendant Muntu Davis, M.D. is the Health Officer of LACDPH, and defendant Barbara Ferrer, PhD is the Director of the LACDPH. [Id., ¶¶ 20-22.] Both individual defendants are named only in their official capacities. [Id.]

B. <u>The Challenged County Policy.</u>

Plaintiff challenges a policy that requires people in the County who have been exposed to COVID-19 to mask while indoors for a period of ten days after such exposure. [FAP, ¶ 10.] Plaintiff alleges that this requirement functions as a *de facto* mask mandate for school-aged children. [Id., ¶ 10-11.] Plaintiff alleges that its members' children have been harmed by previous mask mandates in the County that required masking in schools and youth sports activities. [Id., ¶ 28.]

Plaintiff challenges the scientific basis for a post-exposure masking rule. It alleges that, according to the CDC's Community Levels system as of July 20, 2022, the hospitalization and community transmission metrics placed the County of Los Angeles in the CDC's high risk tier for community transmission. [FAC, ¶¶ 30-33.] Plaintiff, however, asserts that CDC's hospitalization data metrics, upon which LACDPH relied, are inaccurate. [Id., ¶ 34-35.] Specifically, it contends that: (1) LACDPH used the wrong method for calculating hospitalizations and deaths; (2) the studies considered by LACDPH were biased; (3) LACDPH failed to consider certain evidence when deciding to issue COVID-19 public health orders; and (4) LACDPH's data were overinclusive. [Id., ¶¶ 117-18.] Plaintiff also

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STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION UPON
WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED

A. The Standard Applicable To Demurrers.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.10(e) provides that a defendant may demur to a complaint when "[t]he complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law. See Johnson v. County of Los Angeles (1983) 143 Cal. App. 3d 298, 306. "All material facts that were properly pleaded are deemed true, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law." Camacho v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1398 fn. 4. When ruling on a demurrer, courts may "also consider matters which may be judicially noticed." Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 584, 591.

alleges that LACDPH has not conducted any "harm/benefit analysis to determine whether

the harms associated with forcibly masking children outweigh any purported benefit." [Id.,

III.

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST, SECOND, AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION FAIL TO

B. <u>Plaintiff's First and Fourth Causes Of Action Fail Because The LACDPH</u> <u>Defendants' COVID-19 Orders Are Rational.</u>

Plaintiff asserts that LACDPH's requirement that people who have been exposed to COVID-19 mask indoors for 10 days following exposure is an abuse of discretion under CALIFORNIA HEALTH & SAFETY CODE sections 120175 and 101040. [FAC (first cause of action), ¶¶ 10, 117.] Courts review legislative and quasi-legislative acts related to public health and safety under the arbitrary and capricious standard. County of L.A. Dep't of Pub. Health v. Superior Court (2021) 61 Cal. App. 5th 478, 495. The Court will uphold a law under this standard unless a legislative decision is "entirely lacking in evidentiary support." Id. at 493 (emphasis added). Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, a court "cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the [legislature]." Id. at 490. See also id. at 495 ("We decline the Restaurateurs' invitation to second-guess public health

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officials' actions in an 'area fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties." (cleaned

Where a substantive due process claim (fourth cause of action) does not allege

infringement of a fundamental right, the claim is analyzed under the rational basis standard.

Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 185, 189. "For purposes of

obtained." County of L.A. Dep't of Pub. Health, 61 Cal. App. 5th at 490 (cleaned up).

[FAP, ¶¶ 151-52 (alleging that LACDPH COVID-19 orders are arbitrary and

Plaintiff concedes that the rational basis test applies to its substantive due process claim.

unreasonable).] Accordingly, Plaintiff's first claim asserting that LACDP acted in "excess

of power" and its fourth claim asserting substantive due process "constitutional arguments

both call for the same analysis[.]" County of L.A. Dep't of Pub. Health, 61 Cal. App. 5th at

Plaintiff asserts that LACDPH's 10-day masking rule is arbitrary because it fails to

account for the current science around COVID-19. [FAP, ¶¶ 117-18.] Specifically, Plaintiff

deaths; (2) the studies considered by LACDPH were biased; (3) LACDPH failed to consider

certain evidence when deciding to issue COVID-19 public health orders; and (4) LACDPH's

data was overinclusive. [FAP, ¶¶ 117-18.] Each of these reasons is insufficient because it

asks the court to second-guess the public health officials' analysis of data and evidence. In

so doing, Plaintiff necessarily concedes that LACDPH considered the relevant data before

imposing health orders. That Plaintiff disagrees with LACDPH's interpretation of that data

and wishes that LACDPH had followed the studies that Plaintiff advances cannot establish

that LADPH's order is "entirely lacking in evidentiary support." See County of L.A. Dep't

of Pub. Health, 61 Cal. App. 5th at 493. Nor does Plaintiff assert that preventing the spread

of COVID-19 is not a legitimate government interest, nor can it. County of L.A. Dep't of

Pub. Health, 61 Cal. App. 5th at 491 ("Stemming the spread of COVID-19 is

contends that: (1) LACDPH used the wrong method for calculating hospitalizations and

substantive due process claims, the rational basis test is the law must not be unreasonable,

arbitrary or capricious but must have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be

unquestionably a compelling interest . . ."; citing *Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v*. *Cuomo* (2020) 141 S. Ct. 63). Thus, Plaintiff's claim that the 10-day masking rule is arbitrary or lacks any rational basis fails on the pleadings.

Plaintiff's contention that LACDPH has not conducted any "harm/benefit analysis to determine whether the harms associated with forcibly masking children outweigh any purported benefit" does not change this conclusion. [FAP, ¶ 29.] A purported failure to conduct a specific harm/benefit analysis does not render the LACDPH's actions arbitrary and capricious. County of L.A. Dep't of Pub. Health, 61 Cal. App. 5th at 493 (reversing grant of injunction mandating LACDPH to perform risk/benefit analysis for COVID-19 order). "Mandating a nebulous risk-benefit requirement is inconsistent with the court's appropriate role." Id.

Moreover, judicially noticeable documents establish that LACDPH's policy is rational. The CDC still recommends masking to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in K-12 schools. [Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), EXH. A.] "Wearing a well-fitting mask or respirator consistently and correctly reduces the risk of spreading the virus that causes COVID-19." [Id. at 9.] Moreover, the CDC specifically recommends masking following exposure. [Id. at 10 ("people who were exposed to COVID-19 should follow recommendations to wear a well-fitting mask").] As Plaintiff concedes, the County was designated as being at a high risk tier according to the CDC's metrics when Plaintiff initially filed this action in July, 2022 [FAP, ¶ 33], and experts in the field expect transmission levels to rise in the winter months. [Id., ¶ 14.] Because the highest public health authority in the United States continues to recommend masking, it is (and was) rational for LACDPH to conclude that masking is effective to prevent the spread of COVID-19 for students.

C. <u>Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for Violation of the Equal Protection Clause</u> <u>Fails Because Rational Basis Review Applies to Plaintiff's Claim.</u>

Plaintiff's second cause of action alleges that LACDPH violated equal protection because the 10-day masking rule disproportionately impacts children. [See, e.g., FAP, ¶¶ 125, 130 (alleging intentional discrimination against children vis-à-vis adults).] Courts

1	apply a two-step inquiry to equal protection claims under the California Constitution based
2	on a disparate impact theory to determine the proper standard of review. First, courts
3	determine whether the challenged legislation adopts a classification that affects "similarly
4	situated groups in an unequal manner." Kimco Staffing Services, Inc. v. State (2015) 236
5	Cal. App. 4th 875, 884-85 (interpreting Cal. Const., art. I, § 7). Second, if the challenged
6	law treats similarly situated groups unequally, the court must determine the law involves a
7	suspect classification or infringes upon a fundamental right. <i>Id.</i> at 885. Where a distinction
8	between groups is not based on such membership, "a statutory classification must be
9	rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." Clark v. Jeter (1988) 486 U.S.
10	456, 461; see Manduley v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 537,
11	571 (holding that equal protection analysis under the California Constitution is "substantial
12	the equivalent of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
13	States Constitution"). "Rational basis review is the basic and conventional standard for
14	reviewing economic and social welfare legislation in which there is a 'discrimination' or
15	differentiation of treatment between classes or individuals." Kimco Staffing Services, Inc.,
16	236 Cal. App. 4th at 885 (cleaned up)
17	Age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause. <i>Hicks v</i> .
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determine whether the challenged legislation adopts a classification that affects "similarly situated groups in an unequal manner." Kimco Staffing Services, Inc. v. State (2015) 236 Cal. App. 4th 875, 884-85 (interpreting Cal. Const., art. I, § 7). Second, if the challenged law treats similarly situated groups unequally, the court must determine the law involves a suspect classification or infringes upon a fundamental right. *Id.* at 885. Where a distinction between groups is not based on such membership, "a statutory classification must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." Clark v. Jeter (1988) 486 U.S. 456, 461; see Manduley v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 537, 571 (holding that equal protection analysis under the California Constitution is "substantially the equivalent of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution"). "Rational basis review is the basic and conventional standard for reviewing economic and social welfare legislation in which there is a 'discrimination' or differentiation of treatment between classes or individuals." Kimco Staffing Services, Inc., 236 Cal. App. 4th at 885 (cleaned up) Age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause. *Hicks v.* Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal. App. 4th 1649, 1657 ("Age is not an immutable characteristic and is not recognized as a suspect classification under either the United States or California Constitutions."). As stated above, Plaintiff concedes that the challenged policies do not infringe upon a fundamental right. [FAP, \P 151-52] Accordingly, rational basis review applies to Plaintiff's equal protection claim, which Plaintiff also concedes. [See FAP, ¶ 126.] See also Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; Kimco Staffing Services, Inc., 236 Cal. App. 4th at

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885. Thus, Plaintiff's equal protection claim fails for the same reasons as Plaintiff's first and fourth causes of action—because the COVID-19 public health orders are rationally related to a legitimate government interest.

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2	CONCLUSION			
3	For all of the foregoing reason	For all of the foregoing reasons, the County of Los Angeles respectfully requests that		
4	4 the County's demurrer to Plaintiffs'	the County's demurrer to Plaintiffs' first, second, and fourth causes of action be sustained.		
5	5 Dated: October 31, 2022 SH	EPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP		
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7	7 By	Kent C. Com		
8		KENT R. RAYGOR		
9	9	Attorneys for Defendants COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT		
10	0	OF PUBLIC HEALTH, MUNTU DAVIS, M.D., and BARBARA FERRER, PhD		
11	1	and DANDARA FERRER, The		
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DECLARATION OF VALERIE E. ALTER

- I, Valerie E. Alter, declare as follows:
- 1. I am an attorney duly admitted to practice before this Court. I am special counsel to Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, attorneys of record for Defendants County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health, Muntu Davis, M.D., in his official capacity as Health Officer for the County of Los Angeles, and Barbara Ferrer, PhD, in her official capacity as Director of the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health (collectively the "LACDPH Defendants") in this proceeding. If called as a witness, I could and would competently testify to all facts within my personal knowledge except where stated upon information and belief.
- 2. On Monday, October 24, 2022, I met and conferred via telephone with Julie Hamill, counsel for Plaintiff in this matter, about the basis for this demurrer. The parties were unable to reach agreement regarding the first, second and fourth causes of action asserted by Plaintiff in its *First Amended Petition* or the grounds to be asserted by the LACDPH Defendants in this demurrer concerning those causes of action.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed October 31, 2022, at Los Angeles, California.

Valeria F. Alter

Valerie E. Alter

PROOF OF SERVICE 1 Alliance of Los Angeles County v. County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health, et al. 2 Case No. 22STCP02772 3 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE 4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and **not a party to this action**. I 5 am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. My business address is 650 Town Center Drive, 10th Floor, Costa Mesa, CA 92626-1993. 6 On October 31, 2022, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as 7 1. DEFENDANTS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH'S, MUNTU DAVIS, M.D.'S, AND BARBARA 8 FERRER, PHD'S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO 9 PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED PETITION: 2. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 10 THEREOF: 3. DECLARATION OF VALERIE E. ALTER IN SUPPORT THEREOF 11 on the interested parties in this action as follows: 12 Attorney for Petitioner and Plaintiff Julie A. Hamill 13 Hamill Law & Consulting ALLIANCE OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY 904 Silver Spur Road, #287 **PARENTS** Rolling Hills Estates, California, 90274 14 Email: julie@juliehamill-law.com 15 16 **BY MAIL:** I enclosed the document(s) in a sealed envelope or package addressed to the persons at the addresses listed in the Service List and placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with the firm's 17 practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of 18 business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully 19 prepaid. I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. 20 **BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:** I served the document(s) on the person listed in the Service List by submitting an electronic version of the document(s) to One Legal, LLC, 21 through the user interface at www.onelegal.com. 22 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 23 Executed on October 31, 2022, at Costa Mesa, California. 24 25 /s/ Christina Lopez 26 Christina Lopez 27 28

PROOF OF SERVICE

SMRH:4853-5191-0972